Re-Introducing Uncertainty in Russian Elections

My earliest memory of politics is from 1976, when my father stayed up late into the night to find out if Jimmy Carter would defeat Gerald Ford. The energy and excitement that I experienced from watching election results unfold sparked my own scholarly interest in psephology.

Over the years, I have been fortunate to have enjoyed many energizing conversations with Russian colleagues about elections. One of my constant refrains has been that on election eve in democratic societies, citizens do not typically know who will win. This experience is in stark contrast to most elections in Russia in which the outcome is often predetermined.*

For the first time in many years, Russian elections are electric, but not due to the likely outcome. Last week, the Levada Center released its final pre-election polling results, and as many media outlets reported, Vladimir Putin is expected to enjoy a first-round victory. The poll revealed that among likely voters, Putin would receive around 66% of the vote "if the election were held this Sunday." Since the December parliamentary election, Putin's poll numbers have been roughly at this level even in the face of public protests challenging his legitimacy. Among the alternatives, Gennadiy Zyuganov polled at 15%, Vladimir Zhirinovskiy at 8%, Mikhail Prokhorov at 6%, Sergey Mironov at 5%, and 1% of respondents indicated that they would spoil their ballots.

The poll provides a valuable baseline for interpretation of the actual results that will come in over the weekend. As I indicated in a recent article in Comparative Political Studies (gated), election returns in electoral authoritarian societies can provide insight into anti-regime sentiments even when results are manufactured. With the intense scrutiny that polling station officials will face, it will be more challenging to commit fraud at the polls and manufacture outcomes.** But, by undermining and co-opting opposition over the years, and carefully managing the choice set by excluding candidates like Grigoriy Yavlinskiy, election-day manipulation becomes less necessary to generate a Putin victory. The weekend is likely to produce some surprises in the process, and it will be worth paying attention to several matters as voting and vote-tabulation progress.

• Role of technology in the election observation process. The state and citizens plan to use communication technologies to gather and disseminate information about the quality of administrative practices. Hackers have already probed the web cameras placed by officials in polling stations. One would also imagine that the network of citizen-observers planning to post observations via mobile phones will have honest participants along with trolls. The signal-to-noise ratio emerging from these processes will have important implications for how the election is perceived domestically and internationally.
• Divergence from polling. How PM Putin fares in the vote, relative to expectations, is important. But, it will also be interesting to note if opposition supporters converge on an anti-regime alternative. To be sure, some candidates like Zyuganov and Zhirinovsky have core supporters who are not casting a strategic protest vote but instead are voting sincerely. However, Prokhorov,*** in particular, may be able to pull in better numbers than the Levada Center poll reported if strategic voters gravitate toward him as the best proxy for an anti-Putin vote.
• President Putin's post-election message. Because his victory address will likely coincide with public protest, the rhetorical response, along with the reaction of law enforcement, will be an critical signal for how dissent will be managed in the short-term. Recent veiled threats in public addresses, including suggestions that the opposition is controlled from abroad and may commit heinous acts, are not promising signs from PM Putin, however.

Putin has been a savvy politician in the past, but has miscalculated in the last few months as he failed to recognize that he faces a different public than the one that first elected him in 2000. His vitality, strength, decisiveness, and work-ethic served as a welcome change from Boris Yeltsin, but the criteria for judging his presidency have changed. In the near term after the election, Putin and his allies must develop a strategy to rebuild his legitimacy amidst a more active and skeptical public that is unlikely to be quieted by bread and circuses or silent in the face of repression.

Under Putin's leadership, the 2000s served as a counterweight to the excesses of the 1990s. The uncertainty in Russian politics today does not rest in the election results, but in how the 2010s will serve as a counterweight to, or extension of, the excesses of the 2000s.

=================================
*In some years, or in some regions, election results may be all but certain in democratic societies. However, even in my reliably Republican state of Kansas, races can be close and outcomes unclear until all the ballots are counted.
**As my colleague Valentin Mikhailov suggested years ago, we should be cautious about thinking of fraud as a dichotomous outcome (i.e., elections as "dirty" or "clean"). In large elections, fraud occurs. The main questions are: how much occurs, what techniques are used, and how widespread are the effects?
***Prokhorov's skeptics suspect him of being a Kremlin-manufactured technical opposition candidate. Regardless of the origins of his campaign, he may be perceived as the best alternative for opposition voters.

Webcams in Russia

Russia is following Azerbaijan's lead by installing webcams in polling stations for the March 2012 election. Beginning in 2008, Azerbaijan installed webcams in approximately 10% of its polling stations. As I show in a 2010 Electoral Studies article (gated), the presence of webcams was associated with lower reported turnout but had a limited effect on pro-regime voting. In the article, I suggested that polling station officials may report turnout more honestly as webcams would reveal extensive padding of voter participation. However, other forms of fraud would not be revealed through webcam footage. The research supports the OSCE contention that  webcams complement, but do not substitute for, the in-person observation process.

Russia's plan, which would outfit almost all polling stations, would undermine careful observation of the footage. Azerbaijan's placement of webcams in some polling stations permitted me to assess the effects as a quasi experiment, with treatment and control groups. If Russia indeed covers most precincts, it will be difficult to watch all of the footage ("crowdsourced" observation, where many volunteers monitor the footage, may be necessary). Moreover, by "treating" most polling stations, it will not be possible to assess if the presence or absence of webcams affects the process or outcomes.

Taking Stock of Events

Immediately following December's Parliamentary Election, I confidently declared that the election results would not be game-changing. Public as well as elite responses to the outcomes certainly suggest that the political climate has been altered significantly as we enter a new year.

Some of my expectations have been borne out by events on the ground: the reassignment of Vladislav Surkov and President Medvedev's proposal of institutional changes serving as the most prominent examples of elite-level adjustments to public dissatisfaction. But, my expectation that protesters could be quieted by short-term enhancements to social welfare did not take into account the apparent socio-economic characteristics of the demonstrators. Careful research takes time, and often lags behind events, but if observations of protests populated by young and/or middle-class citizens turn out to be accurate, policy-based payoffs may not be enough. Russia's political elite may indeed offer various kinds of payments as the election approaches, but their effects may be mitigated by the seeming diversity of demands among the dissatisfied.

If the scheduled February protest garners large-scale participation and limited or no repression, it could propel events even further into uncharted territories for contemporary Russia. But, as Ukrainians learned five hard years after Maidan, an opposition united primarily to unseat an authoritarian regime may win a battle - but winning the war is much more difficult.

Game Changer?

In a word, no. While the media has emphasized United Russia's losses (here and here, for example), the "setback" is only in relative terms. Most political parties would be satisfied with a loss that gave them a majority in the legislative body (after seats are distributed, UR will have more than 50%, even if it does not quite pass the 50% mark in votes). UR will be able to gain legislative support from at least two of the other parties for policy initiatives. Yes, "deliberations" are likely to occur as part of the legislative process, but Just Russia and the LDPR are likely to fall in line when it matters. Just Russia is technically an independent party, but it was Kremlin-spawned and will be supportive. The LDPR's first electoral success was as the repository for protest votes and its leader is known for appearing to be a populist who challenges authorities (see especially Zhirinovskiy's clashes with the CEC back in 1999). The LDPR will also comply when needed.

The only "real" opposition is the Communist Party and its gains are likely due to its status as the new repository for protest votes. Its gains are unlikely to presage a Communist resurgence, however. Having an opposition party that favors state solutions (rather than a rightist opposition) also plays to the Kremlin's advantage .

The response to electoral loss is likely to take several forms:
1) Lobnoye Mesto will be in business as Prime Minister Putin can use the results as justification to make heads roll in the party. The job will fall to Medvedev, assuming that he does not take the blame.
2) Populist policies are likely to be pushed through parliament in the coming months, providing some short-term economic relief through enhancements to pensions, social welfare, housing, or other needs. Putin will spearhead some measures to shore up support in advance of the presidential election.
3) Evidence that the "people's dissatisfaction" is being heard at the top may also come through additional attention to corruption (and another opportunity to clean house like 1) above).

In short, while UR's seat total dropped, and this outcome is likely a direct reflection of public dissatisfaction, political elites still have many opportunities to make policy with limited compromise. Indeed, the loss provides cover for changes to elite cadres that could benefit former and future President Putin.

Troubling Signs

Although it has been clear for some time that tomorrow's parliamentary elections in Russia are a managed affair, pressure on the well-regarded local observation organization Golos suggests that the quality of management may be of concern to United Russia. Prime Minister Putin was subjected to boos at a recent public event, and his reception by MMA fans was inexpertly spun by the administration. Reports also indicate that support for the party of power is sagging.

When elections are manufactured well ahead of election day, activities in polling stations are generally orderly and may not provide evidence of egregious fraud. But, officials have incentives to use different techniques on election day if uncertainty is higher. Pressure on Golos is worth noting as it may suggest heightened potential for shenanigans on the ground tomorrow.

Dissent in Electoral Authoritarian Societies

In a forthcoming article (Comparative Political Studies, 2012 [Update: the article has been moved up to the November 2011 issue]), I use data from Azerbaijan's 2008 presidential election and 2009 referendum to evaluate dissenting votes. Votes that do not support the regime's preferred outcome could be residuals of a process of vote manufacturing directed by central or regional authorities, they could be generated by citizens, or they could be produced by some combination of citizen action and elite interference. I develop three measures of dissent using data from election returns, and assess several hypotheses to adjudicate among the competing explanations. While Azerbaijan's politics are opaque, the results suggest that interference from officials and citizen actions account for the dissent in the two votes under analysis. The paper further indicates how dissenting votes may be analyzed and interpreted in other electoral authoritarian regimes.

The paper will be published sometime next year. The promised online appendix and replication data are available here.

Yanukovych's Year

The anniversary of Viktor Yanukovych's presidential election win is drawing near. The February 2011 edition of East European Politics & Societies is dedicated to this topic and includes my article assessing Yanukovych's victory. The article evaluates two of the dominant narratives in the election: that they were largely free of fraud, and that they reflect the traditional spatial divides. I find evidence supporting both narratives.

The paper was originally presented at the conference "Ukraine's 2010 Presidential Election: What We Learned" held at George Washington University in March 2010. I streamlined the paper for publication, cutting several maps and tables. They are available here as supplements to the published article.

Supplementary Table

Supplementary Maps

In the article, I also note a third narrative: Yanukovych's victory signaled a defeat of the Orange Revolution. At the time I composed the article, it was too early to assess that narrative. The intervening months have demonstrated strong efforts by the new administration to consolidate power and restrict competition. Most notably, local elections in some areas of the country showed evidence of significant abuses of power. I participated in election observation in Odesa as a representative of the Committee for Open Democracy and witnessed strong evidence of fraud that I discussed in a press conference. The local elections were followed by challenges to opposition leaders, including prominent politicians like Yuliya Tymoshenko and Yuriy Lutsenko, including recent jailing of the latter. These events, and others in the last year, bode ill for democratic processes in Ukraine.

Referendum Moves Forward

Despite the humanitarian crisis in southern Kyrgyzstan, propelled by violence largely aimed at the Uzbek minority, Interim President Roza Otunbayeva has announced that the constitutional referendum scheduled for June 27 will move forward. In her remarks, Otunbayeva notes the problem of holding the vote with a large movement of internally displaced citizens and refugees fleeing into Uzbekistan, but claims that the referendum needs to be held.

If UNHCR estimates are correct (reported by ITAR-TASS), the exodus of (primarily ethnically Uzbek) citizens is large - around 275,000. The logistical problem of ensuring the franchise for voters who are not in their home districts, and likely will not request absentee certificates, is tremendous. The scale of the violence, moreover, will deter citizens from participating. It is hard to imagine that a legitimate vote can be organized under conditions present in the south.

For more on the crisis, see posts at Registan.net, Eurasianet.org, Global Voices, as well as Kabar.kg for the official point of view.

On a personal note, I spent some time in Osh a few years ago and have several friends and colleagues in Kyrgyzstan. I want to extend my heartfelt concern to them and their families, as well as hope that peace and order will return soon to this lovely city.

A Win for Misha?

While Mikheil Saakashvili's National Movement performed well in local elections (and especially in Tbilisi), the OSCE has identified "significant shortcomings" to free and fair practices. Vote Georgia has extensive information based on reports from several NGOs. The CEC is also reporting results (English). If Misha hoped to use local elections as a means to shore up international support, early reports suggest that this effort has failed.

UPDATE: Social Science in the Caucasus has posted fabulous maps based on polling-station level data.

Two "Parties" in Turkmenistan

Post-Soviet political elites understand that electoral and democratic theater can have some value, even if it is cynical and absurd. The Chronicles of Turkmenistan discusses a plan to create a "Farmer's Party," and Registan.net and Eternal Remont also comment on the purported change. As all three blogs noted, the effort may be a bit too cynical and absurd to gain even the slightest hint of praise from the outside, and it will likely make little difference on the inside.

However, authoritarian regimes usually have patronage networks that extract resources and provide support to the leadership. The creation of a new party apparatus could generate a conduit of material resources that may marginally modify the inner workings of Turkmenistan's political process (as the Registan post also suggests).