Все на Выборы!

Webcams in Russia

2012-01-27T06:57:00.002-06:00

Russia is following Azerbaijan's lead by installing webcams in polling stations for the March 2012 election. Beginning in 2008, Azerbaijan installed webcams in approximately 10% of its polling stations. As I show in a 2010 Electoral Studies article (gated), the presence of webcams was associated with lower reported turnout but had a limited effect on pro-regime voting. In the article, I suggested that polling station officials may report turnout more honestly as webcams would reveal extensive padding of voter participation. However, other forms of fraud would not be revealed through webcam footage. The research supports the OSCE contention that webcams complement, but do not substitute for, the in-person observation process.

Russia's plan, which would outfit almost all polling stations, would undermine careful observation of the footage. Azerbaijan's placement of webcams in some polling stations permitted me to assess the effects as a quasi experiment, with treatment and control groups. If Russia indeed covers most precincts, it will be difficult to watch all of the footage ("crowdsourced" observation, where many volunteers monitor the footage, may be necessary). Moreover, by "treating" most polling stations, it will not be possible to assess if the presence or absence of webcams affects the process or outcomes.

Taking Stock of Events

2012-01-03T11:35:00.002-06:00

Immediately following December's Parliamentary Election, I confidently declared that the election results would not be game-changing. Public as well as elite responses to the outcomes certainly suggest that the political climate has been altered significantly as we enter a new year.

Some of my expectations have been borne out by events on the ground: the reassignment of Vladislav Surkov and President Medvedev's proposal of institutional changes serving as the most prominent examples of elite-level adjustments to public dissatisfaction. But, my expectation that protesters could be quieted by short-term enhancements to social welfare did not take into account the apparent socio-economic characteristics of the demonstrators. Careful research takes time, and often lags behind events, but if observations of protests populated by young and/or middle-class citizens turn out to be accurate, policy-based payoffs may not be enough. Russia's political elite may indeed offer various kinds of payments as the election approaches, but their effects may be mitigated by the seeming diversity of demands among the dissatisfied.

If the scheduled February protest garners large-scale participation and limited or no repression, it could propel events even further into uncharted territories for contemporary Russia. But, as Ukrainians learned five hard years after Maidan, an opposition united primarily to unseat an authoritarian regime may win a battle - but winning the war is much more difficult.

Game Changer?

2011-12-05T06:18:00.001-06:00

In a word, no. While the media has emphasized United Russia's losses (here and here, for example), the "setback" is only in relative terms. Most political parties would be satisfied with a loss that gave them a majority in the legislative body (after seats are distributed, UR will have more than 50%, even if it does not quite pass the 50% mark in votes). UR will be able to gain legislative support from at least two of the other parties for policy initiatives. Yes, "deliberations" are likely to occur as part of the legislative process, but Just Russia and the LDPR are likely to fall in line when it matters. Just Russia is technically an independent party, but it was Kremlin-spawned and will be supportive. The LDPR's first electoral success was as the repository for protest votes and its leader is known for appearing to be a populist who challenges authorities (see especially Zhirinovskiy's clashes with the CEC back in 1999). The LDPR will also comply when needed.

The only "real" opposition is the Communist Party and its gains are likely due to its status as the new repository for protest votes. Its gains are unlikely to presage a Communist resurgence, however. Having an opposition party that favors state solutions (rather than a rightist opposition) also plays to the Kremlin's advantage .

The response to electoral loss is likely to take several forms:
1) Lobnoye Mesto will be in business as Prime Minister Putin can use the results as justification to make heads roll in the party. The job will fall to Medvedev, assuming that he does not take the blame.
2) Populist policies are likely to be pushed through parliament in the coming months, providing some short-term economic relief through enhancements to pensions, social welfare, housing, or other needs. Putin will spearhead some measures to shore up support in advance of the presidential election.
3) Evidence that the "people's dissatisfaction" is being heard at the top may also come through additional attention to corruption (and another opportunity to clean house like 1) above).

In short, while UR's seat total dropped, and this outcome is likely a direct reflection of public dissatisfaction, political elites still have many opportunities to make policy with limited compromise. Indeed, the loss provides cover for changes to elite cadres that could benefit former and future President Putin.

Troubling Signs

2011-12-03T17:15:00.000-06:00

Although it has been clear for some time that tomorrow's parliamentary elections in Russia are a managed affair, pressure on the well-regarded local observation organization Golos suggests that the quality of management may be of concern to United Russia. Prime Minister Putin was subjected to boos at a recent public event, and his reception by MMA fans was inexpertly spun by the administration. Reports also indicate that support for the party of power is sagging.

When elections are manufactured well ahead of election day, activities in polling stations are generally orderly and may not provide evidence of egregious fraud. But, officials have incentives to use different techniques on election day if uncertainty is higher. Pressure on Golos is worth noting as it may suggest heightened potential for shenanigans on the ground tomorrow.

Dissent in Electoral Authoritarian Societies

2011-05-11T14:04:00.009-05:00

In a forthcoming article (Comparative Political Studies, ~~2012~~ [Update: the article has been moved up to the November 2011 issue]), I use data from Azerbaijan's 2008 presidential election and 2009 referendum to evaluate dissenting votes. Votes that do not support the regime's preferred outcome could be residuals of a process of vote manufacturing directed by central or regional authorities, they could be generated by citizens, or they could be produced by some combination of citizen action and elite interference. I develop three measures of dissent using data from election returns, and assess several hypotheses to adjudicate among the competing explanations. While Azerbaijan's politics are opaque, the results suggest that interference from officials and citizen actions account for the dissent in the two votes under analysis. The paper further indicates how dissenting votes may be analyzed and interpreted in other electoral authoritarian regimes.

~~The paper will be published sometime next year~~. The promised online appendix and replication data are available here.

Yanukovych's Year

2011-01-07T14:11:00.004-06:00

The anniversary of Viktor Yanukovych's presidential election win is drawing near. The February 2011 edition of East European Politics & Societies is dedicated to this topic and includes my article assessing Yanukovych's victory. The article evaluates two of the dominant narratives in the election: that they were largely free of fraud, and that they reflect the traditional spatial divides. I find evidence supporting both narratives.

The paper was originally presented at the conference "Ukraine's 2010 Presidential Election: What We Learned" held at George Washington University in March 2010. I streamlined the paper for publication, cutting several maps and tables. They are available here as supplements to the published article.

Supplementary Table

Supplementary Maps

In the article, I also note a third narrative: Yanukovych's victory signaled a defeat of the Orange Revolution. At the time I composed the article, it was too early to assess that narrative. The intervening months have demonstrated strong efforts by the new administration to consolidate power and restrict competition. Most notably, local elections in some areas of the country showed evidence of significant abuses of power. I participated in election observation in Odesa as a representative of the Committee for Open Democracy and witnessed strong evidence of fraud that I discussed in a press conference. The local elections were followed by challenges to opposition leaders, including prominent politicians like Yuliya Tymoshenko and Yuriy Lutsenko, including recent jailing of the latter. These events, and others in the last year, bode ill for democratic processes in Ukraine.

Referendum Moves Forward

2010-06-15T08:33:00.002-05:00

Despite the humanitarian crisis in southern Kyrgyzstan, propelled by violence largely aimed at the Uzbek minority, Interim President Roza Otunbayeva has announced that the constitutional referendum scheduled for June 27 will move forward. In her remarks, Otunbayeva notes the problem of holding the vote with a large movement of internally displaced citizens and refugees fleeing into Uzbekistan, but claims that the referendum needs to be held.

If UNHCR estimates are correct (reported by ITAR-TASS), the exodus of (primarily ethnically Uzbek) citizens is large - around 275,000. The logistical problem of ensuring the franchise for voters who are not in their home districts, and likely will not request absentee certificates, is tremendous. The scale of the violence, moreover, will deter citizens from participating. It is hard to imagine that a legitimate vote can be organized under conditions present in the south.

For more on the crisis, see posts at Registan.net, Eurasianet.org, Global Voices, as well as Kabar.kg for the official point of view.

On a personal note, I spent some time in Osh a few years ago and have several friends and colleagues in Kyrgyzstan. I want to extend my heartfelt concern to them and their families, as well as hope that peace and order will return soon to this lovely city.

A Win for Misha?

2010-06-01T08:03:00.003-05:00

While Mikheil Saakashvili's National Movement performed well in local elections (and especially in Tbilisi), the OSCE has identified "significant shortcomings" to free and fair practices. Vote Georgia has extensive information based on reports from several NGOs. The CEC is also reporting results (English). If Misha hoped to use local elections as a means to shore up international support, early reports suggest that this effort has failed.

UPDATE: Social Science in the Caucasus has posted fabulous maps based on polling-station level data.

Two "Parties" in Turkmenistan

2010-05-29T07:09:00.005-05:00

Post-Soviet political elites understand that electoral and democratic theater can have some value, even if it is cynical and absurd. The Chronicles of Turkmenistan discusses a plan to create a "Farmer's Party," and Registan.net and Eternal Remont also comment on the purported change. As all three blogs noted, the effort may be a bit too cynical and absurd to gain even the slightest hint of praise from the outside, and it will likely make little difference on the inside.

However, authoritarian regimes usually have patronage networks that extract resources and provide support to the leadership. The creation of a new party apparatus could generate a conduit of material resources that may marginally modify the inner workings of Turkmenistan's political process (as the Registan post also suggests).

Upcoming Votes

2010-05-29T06:22:00.006-05:00

The interim government of Kyrgyzstan has scheduled a referendum, presidential election, and parliamentary election. The referendum, Kyrgyzstan's 7th since the collapse of the USSR, would alter the constitution to reduce presidential power. A draft version is available at Kabar.kg in Russian along with a list of changes. Eurasianet has posted an analysis of the changes. The referendum should take place on June 27, 2010. The interim government originally announced that it would hold concurrent presidential and parliamentary elections on October 10, 2010. However, it recently announced a delay to the presidential election, pushing back the date of the first round until December 2011. The decree extending Interim President Otunbayeva's power was published on May 20, 2010.

Local elections are taking place in Georgia tomorrow (IFES has a succinct description of the voting). Mayoral positions, especially in post-Soviet capital cities, are powerful posts. So, it is not surprising that the contest for Tbilisi mayor has been especially visible. This election is, not surprisingly, controversial, and it is particularly perceived as a "test" of embattled President Mikheil Saakashvili. [For a Russian view of the election's problems, see this RIA Novosti story.] Eurasianet also has some interesting coverage of IDPs and voting (here and here).

The OSCE has deployed observation teams for the Kyrgyz referendum and Georgian local elections.

Russia has also held local elections and a couple of the results have not been favorable for United Russia, with the Communist Party candidates winning mayoral races in Bratsk and Irkutsk.

Revolutionary "Reversals"

2010-04-07T15:22:00.007-05:00

The "Colored Revolutions" that dominated coverage of the former Soviet region beginning over six years ago have witnessed different kinds of reversals. Indeed, their fifth anniversaries have been cruel reminders that political life has changed less in some parts of the former Soviet Union than one would hope.

The Rose Revolution in Georgia was led by Mikheil Saakashvili and other opposition leaders who agreed to align with him as the best option for ousting the corrupt regime of Eduard Shevardnadze. Saakashvili was known at the time to act rashly - witness his tactical differences with his erstwhile allies Zurab Zhvania and Nino Burjanadze while the Rose Revolution was unfolding. Nearly five years after the Rose Revolution, Saakashvili's rash behavior led to crackdowns on the opposition and contributed to the August 2008 war with Russia.

In Ukraine, former President Viktor Yushchenko's ineffective tenure and his intense personal animosity toward Yuliya Tymoshenko helped to weaken the forces behind the Orange Revolution. Tymoshenko herself is not guiltless, having pursued opportunistic policies and antagonistic tactics. Meanwhile Viktor Yanukovych adopted a more disciplined and softer image, in part due to his association with an American PR firm, and succeeded in securing a legitimate victory in 2010. Although this "reversal" came through an election process that was generally free and fair, recent developments raise concerns about a return to pre-revolutionary ways (notably the manner in which the parliamentary coalition was formed outside statutory and constitutional bounds - even if the packed court upholds the decision).

Kyrgyzstan's so-called "Tulip Revolution" was clearly different from its supposed kin. The 2005 ouster of Askar Akayev did not elevate political elite who favored transparency and the rule of law. Rather, Kurmanbek Bakiyev changed the patronage networks that enjoyed access to power and wealth. Kyrgyzstan may have appeared to be more democratic than its neighbors, but the standards are low in the neighborhood. If he has been ousted today as some news sources are reporting, he has befallen a similar fate as his predecessor five years ago. UPDATE: The website for Kabar (a Kyrgyz news agency) is responding slowly, as one would anticipate. But, it is also reporting the opposition's claims of government's resignation.

State of Emergency in Kyrgyzstan

2010-04-07T08:28:00.002-05:00

Conflict has been brewing in Kyrgyzstan, and it took an ugly turn today. While all of the facts on the ground are not clear, clashes between protesters and government forces have led to the declaration of a state of emergency (CNN and Lenta).

Azerbaijan Webcam Redux

2010-03-30T09:14:00.002-05:00

As I mentioned in a previous post, I recently composed a paper addressing the effects of election monitoring on reported outcomes in Azerbaijan. This paper is now forthcoming in the journal Electoral Studies. The analysis shows that the presence of webcams in polling stations is consistently associated with depressed turnout figures. Webcams are also associated with lower levels of regime support in the referendum. Because journals have limited space, this post includes supplementary materials that accompany the paper.

Supplementary Table 1 = t-tests for turnout across all reporting periods. The tests for each reporting period show a statistically significant difference between monitored and unmonitored polling stations, with monitored polling stations consistently experiencing lower reported turnout than unmonitored polling stations.

The final turnout report differs from the 7 p.m. report in many cases. In the presidential election, 40% of the 7 p.m. reports did not differ from final turnout, and the standard deviation was 9.2 (in percentage point terms). In the referendum, 76% of the 7 p.m. reports did not differ from final turnout as reported in the protocol, and the standard deviation was 3.5.

The presidential election featured many ballots cast via absentee certificates, creating a challenge for calculating turnout. The periodic reports are based on the number of registered voters; absentee certificate users are not registered in the polling stations. The protocols include more detailed information about the composition of voters reporting to each polling station. Reports could differ due to complications arising from the use of absentee certificates, errors, or misrepresentation.

Supplementary Table 2 = results of the analysis of turnout with unmatched data.

Supplementary Table 3 = results of the analysis of outcomes with unmatched data.

R code for generating and assessing the matched data.

Replication Data (presidential and referendum).

Voter Apathy in Tajikistan

2010-02-25T10:41:00.002-06:00

IFES has just published a summary of its recent public opinion poll addressing Tajikistan's upcoming parliamentary election. The poll notes a lack of interest and engagement on the part of respondents. The OSCE's preliminary report indicates that the campaign has been correspondingly "low key." While political observers note that the party-of-power, the People's Democratic Party, is expected to gain most seats, other parties might marginally improve their status. Notably, RFE/RL suggests that the Islamic Renaissance Party could improve its seat total from two to ten. Tajikistan uses a mixed electoral system, allocating 41 of its 63 total seats to constituencies with a majority-runoff rule and the remaining 22 to a party-list component.

It's Official

2010-02-25T10:37:00.002-06:00

Viktor Yanukovych was inaugurated as president of Ukraine earlier today. The BBC's story follows.

Valentine for Yanukovych

2010-02-14T16:48:00.005-06:00

Viktor Yanukovych was named the official winner of Ukraine's election today, a decision that Yuliya Tymoshenko says that she will appeal. Tymoshenko's appeal is an extreme long-shot, as no evidence of large-scale fraud has been offered, the Central Electoral Commission leans toward Yanukovych, and the courts are unlikely to render a judgment similar to the one that precipitated a repeat of the second round of the 2004 election. Yanukovych could also undermine Tymoshenko by reaching beyond the Party of Regions for appointments that he will control. Undoubtedly, the political elite in the Party of Regions are debating how to allocate positions after their victory as the Guardian article cited above suggests (and probably projecting what will happen if/when the PoR topples Tymoshenko from the prime minister's post). If the PoR thinks short-term, it will jealously guard the spoils. If it thinks long-term, the PoR may attempt to expand its coalition to undermine Tymoshenko's (or another opponent's) ability to form future alliances.

What Comes Next?

2010-02-10T07:05:00.004-06:00

The Central Electoral Commission has tallied the ballots and published the final results, moving toward a formalization of Viktor Yanukovych's victory. Yuliya Tymoshenko's team has suggested that it will challenge the results. Because the results are close - 887,928 votes separate the two - invalidation of results in some districts could raise questions about the final tally. International and domestic organizations found no evidence of large-scale fraud, undermining mobilization and rendering court decisions that would overturn the results extremely unlikely. As I have noted before, the issue of fraud is related to its scale rather than its presence; if one looks hard enough, it is likely that evidence of fraud will indeed be found. While I have not yet assembled polling-station level data for assessment, it is likely to be small scale and diffuse.

The election challenge gambit is layered on top of another drama in Kyiv: efforts to oust Tymoshenko as prime minister. Forming a new coalition would require strange bedfellows. The idea of a grand coalition between the Party of Regions and Our Ukraine has been floated before, but pairing Our Ukraine and the Communists is a tougher sell to members and constituents of both groups. If Yanukovych's team comes up with a coalition, it could avoid the potential perils of early elections. But, its coalition might be weak and fractious. Moreover, coalition partners would expect cabinet posts (it is likely Our Ukraine would demand the prime minister's portfolio, with someone like Yuriy Yekhanurov taking the post). Alternatively, Yanukovych's team could engineer a collapse of the current coalition which has barely held together, and set up early parliamentary elections. Parliamentary elections are a risk, however, as they may not yield a coalition to Yanukovych's liking.

Ukraine's Big Game

2010-02-07T07:39:00.010-06:00

The vote is underway all over Ukraine, and polls will close at 8 p.m. local time (1 p.m. Eastern time in the US). You can follow the action on various twitter feeds, the National Exit Poll, and many news sites (I am partial to Ukrainska Pravda). I will post updates throughout the day as well.

UPDATE (4:15 p.m. local time): The CEC just released turnout data for the first two reporting periods. Eastern regions (Donetsk and Luhansk) lead the way with 57% of voters casting ballots by 3 p.m. Zakarpatska Oblast has reported lowest turnout (35%), and one oblast has not yet reported in (Chernivets). Turnout in many western regions where Tymoshenko is expected to be stronger is relatively low (L'viv Oblast reports 46%, Ivano-Frankivsk 41%). Regions where Tihipko performed the best in the first round did not generally report high turnout; Dnipropetrovsk was just about at the mean (49%) and Odesa was below the mean (42%). As I have noted before, Tymoshenko's areas of strength have lower populations than Yanukovych-leaning regions. Large-scale mobilization of core supporters is especially important for her to have a chance at victory. Volyn, Ternopil, and Rivne reported turnout above the mean, but lower than turnout in Yanukovych's core regions. While projecting outcomes from turnout data is problematic for several reasons, on their face the data suggest that Yanukovych is likely in a better position than Tymoshenko at this point in the day.

UPDATE (8:15 p.m. local time): All exit polls are giving the nod to Viktor Yanukovych. While results vary, Yanukovych is predicted to have around 49%, Tymoshenko 46%, and the remainder (5% or so) against all.

UPDATE (10:30 p.m. local time): Of course, as Tymoshenko herself noted, exit poll results are within the standard margin of error rendering a definitive prediction elusive. While the CEC site has not yet posted results, Ukrainska Pravda currently has information on about 1% of the votes and will be updating regularly.

UPDATE (1:00 a.m. (February 8) local time): With 25% of the votes counted, Viktor Yanukovych leads 51% to 43%. Based on the SOCIS exit poll, Ukrainska Pravda has published a "portrait" of the electorate for each candidate. In most demographic features, the candidates' supporters are essentially equivalent. While I do not have the raw data to run a quick test, I suspect that there would be a statistically significant difference in supporters based on residence - with rural regions favoring Tymoshenko and large urban areas favoring Yanukovych.

UPDATE (2:45 a.m. (February 8) local time): With just about 50% of the vote counted, the CEC reports that Yanukovych leads 49.52% to 44.85% with 4.49% of ballots cast against all and 1.12% invalid. Eleven regions have processed fewer than 50% of their protocols: Crimea (15%), Volyn (27%), Luhansk (31%), Ivano-Frankivsk (31%), L'viv (32%), Chernivets (35%), Kirovohrad (36%), Sumska (39%), Rivne (45%), Kyiv Oblast (47%), Zaporizka (47%). While many of these regions are in Tymoshenko's area of strength, other high-population areas of Yanukovych support still have many protocols to finalize.

Below is a table of turnout, with results sorted by oblast. The three results are reports from 11 a.m., 3 p.m., and 8 p.m.. Given the stakes, and the decisive status of round 2, higher turnout is not surprising (although it surpassed round 1 by just a few percentage points where turnout was 66.76%). Areas with core supporters for both candidates seem to have been mobilized, but regions where alternate candidates performed well in round 1 have lower turnout (e.g., Yatseniuk's core area in Chernivets, Tihipko's regions of strength in Dnipropetrovsk and Odesa).

Пo Україні	17.63	49.85	69.07
Тернопільська область (165 - 169)	12.91	49.22	77.76
Донецька область (41 - 62)	22.46	57.41	76.97
Волинська область (19 - 23)	13.89	48.75	75.52
Львівська область (117 - 128)	12.84	46.44	75.32
Івано-Франківська область (84 - 90)	11.74	45.77	74.65
Луганська область (105 - 116)	24.27	57.07	74.41
Рівненська область (154 - 158)	14.65	51.94	73.8
Хмельницька область (190 - 196)	18.56	52.33	71.63
Вінницька область (11 - 18)	17.9	52.18	70.89
Запорізька область (75 - 83)	20.04	52.81	68.88
Житомирська область (63 - 68)	16.92	46.05	67.71
Харківська область (170 - 183)	18.98	49.6	67.2
Автономна Республіка Крим (1 - 10)	18.43	50.53	67.1
Полтавська область (146 - 153)	18.82	50.83	66.79
Дніпропетровська область (24 - 40)	19.68	49.8	66.78
Сумська область (159 - 164)	19.39	51.29	66.77
Миколаївська область (129 - 134)	20.74	51.54	66.23
Черкаська область (197 - 203)	18.35	49.55	66.11
Київська область (91 - 99)	17.99	48.97	64.58
Одеська область (135 - 145)	15.49	45.89	63.37
Кіровоградська область (100 - 104)	19.32	47.54	63.27
Чернівецька область (204 - 207)	15.38	44.54	61.58
Херсонська область (184 - 189)	17.06	46.79	60.3
Закарпатська область (69 - 74)	9.33	35.22	56.37

UPDATE (3:00 p.m. (February 8) local time): With 98.26% of the protocols in, the CEC is reporting that Yanukovych has received 48.56% of the vote and Yuliya Tymoshenko 45.85% of the vote, with 4.39% voting against all. The against all vote - citizens who come to the polls to record a vote against both candidates - could have changed the outcome if they voted for a single candidate. The against all vote could also have vaulted either candidate above 50%. I'll comment on the implications of Yanukovych's apparent win later.

Richard Nixon, Al Gore, and Today's Ukraine

2010-02-06T06:57:00.007-06:00

According to political lore, Richard Nixon and Al Gore ultimately assented to elections that they believed opponents won improperly. Both the 1960 and 2000 presidential elections in the US were close contests, and supporters of the ultimate losers argued that vote manipulation and/or biased administrative decisions determined the winner, rather than the proper translation of the "people's will." They did not mobilize street protests, or endlessly extend appeals. While elections can sometimes be too close to produce a definitive result that satisfies everyone, democracy requires good winners and good losers.

Ukraine may be faced with a similar scenario on Monday morning. While conventional wisdom holds that it is Tymoshenko who will come up short in the vote count, it may be quite close depending on how effectively both campaigns have mobilized their supporters. Tymoshenko has promised to take demonstrators to the streets if democratic practices are not followed; both campaigns have requested permission to hold rallies in Kyiv.

The election, and its aftermath, may have important implications for Ukraine's democracy. Both the winner and loser - as well as supporters - need to accept the results and occupy their positions as leader of the executive, and leader of the opposition. The winner should resist the temptation to overreach in the assertion of his/her mandate. Moreover, constant change to political institutions undermines the development of stable competitive politics. The loser should resist the temptation to endlessly appeal the decision and disrupt governance practices. Power changes hands in democratic societies; if the loser learns lessons from failure and applies them to the next campaign, the outcome may be different.

Yanukovych himself may, perhaps ironically, serve as an example. If he wins tomorrow's election, his narrative turns into the tale of a political phoenix. He lost the 2004 election and suffered political humiliation. Recognizing that he needed to change his image, he hired consultants and followed their advice. His tone softened a bit, and he followed a set of talking points. His party's victory in the 2006 parliamentary election [1] marked his return as a viable electoral force. While he failed to extend his victory in the 2007 parliamentary election, the winning coalition had a bare majority, experienced infighting, and faced the economic crisis as the standing government. His team's actions, as well as some "luck," may take him from embarrassing defeat to victory.

1. Technically, the Party of Regions obtained the most votes, but did not "win" the election. However, Yanukovych's allies were able to cobble together a coalition that briefly ruled until early parliamentary elections tipped the balance to Tymoshenko's team in 2007.

Quality of Election Administration, Part 7

2010-02-05T06:21:00.004-06:00

Left Bank has published an analysis of first round results, pointing out some anomalies in the distribution of data. The authors use Benford's Law to assess returns, much like I did in Elections and Democracy after Communism. They point to unusual results associated with both Yanukovych and Tymoshenko. The article implies that falsification took place and the tests identify fraud. But, results from the analysis of data using Benford's principles must be assessed with care. First, they point only to anomalous results and do not demonstrate causation. Second, the distribution of election data differs from the kind of data that Benford assessed (especially because polling station sizes are constrained and vary from one to another). Third, forensic accountants who use Benford's Law to assess financial data often use a battery of "data interrogation tests" to assess quality; one test is not enough. Other issues associated with the analysis of election data underscore the need for a circumspect interpretation of results. However, in past elections, analysis using Benford's Law has identified anomalies in areas where other evidence of falsification emerged.

On a related note, controversy has erupted over administrative practices for the second round. The Verkhovna Rada was convened for its 6th session this week, and amended aspects of the presidential election law which the president quickly signed. Changing the law days ahead of an election, and between rounds, is an unusual practice. But, Ukrainian politicians have amended election rules regularly ahead of the vote. The changes focused on minor administrative procedures, but may have serious implications for the vote count. The quorum rule for commissions was altered, allowing for decisions to be made without the previously mandated 2/3 attendance (instead, quorum is now a majority). Commission members may be replaced, and the rules do not require that they represent the same presidential candidate (only that they have approval of local government and the higher-level electoral commission).

Tymoshenko issued a statement about the rule changes, asserting that they were improper and undermine the electoral process. The Party of Regions countered that Tymoshenko's supporters were planning to undermine vote counting in areas where Yanukovych is strong by not showing up and preventing results from being counted and certified. Tymoshenko was lying about the effect of the new rules, according to the Party of Regions. Both parties have been willing to disrupt government activities in the Verkhovna Rada by blocking the Speaker's access to the dais, and creating noise that prevents deliberation and decision-making. In that context, the Party of Regions' allegations that BYuT might disrupt electoral practices are not out of the question. Also, a majority quorum rule is standard for bodies to convene (see Robert's Rules of Order). Nevertheless, last minute rule changes are generally inadvisable as they may lead to a perception of impropriety and may be difficult to implement.

[Hat tip to Maksym Palamarenko for the Left Bank citation and Mark Nigrini for the "data interrogation tests" phrase.]

Two Viktors?

2010-02-01T19:52:00.003-06:00

Viktor Yanukovych skipped the only scheduled debate with rival Yuliya Tymoshenko. His failure to show up gave Tymoshenko the opportunity to tear into him, and she did so with gusto. Tymoshenko called him a "banal coward" and suggested that there are two versions of Yanukovych: one is a PR product, and the other is hidden from view by his campaign team. While enduring such a tongue-lashing on national television is not generally in the best interests of a candidate less than one week before an election, Yanukovych may have been better served by avoiding the confrontation. He entered the second round in the strongest position, and given his relatively weak performance on the Shuster program prior to round 1, his more profitable approach is to stay on message and in venues that allow for purely scripted appearances.

Quality of Election Administration, Part 6

2010-01-28T20:47:00.003-06:00

The Yanukovych and Tymoshenko campaigns have been casting aspersions at each other, alleging preparations for falsification of the upcoming second round. The campaigns have battled over a ballot printing facility, a judge on the Kyiv High Court of Appeals (that adjudicates election disputes), and now the sitting Minister of the Interior. While the Rada voted to oust him today, he will remain in place until a replacement is named. Tymoshenko is unlikely to put this high on her agenda, preferring to keep Lutsenko in his post.

Another Upcoming Election

2010-01-28T13:07:00.002-06:00

While my attention remains fixed on events in Ukraine, the campaign season has begun in Tajikistan. After the dust settles in Ukraine's February 7 runoff, I will post some information about Tajikistan's contest as well.

Tipping His Hat?

2010-01-27T12:44:00.000-06:00

Sergey Tihipko has remained coy about aligning with Viktor Yanukovych or Yuliya Tymoshenko. However, National Radio reports that he considers Yuliya's "offer much stronger..." than Yanukovych's. Of course, neither candidate can promise Tihipko the PM's post. While the president can nominate the PM, constitutional reforms leave the final decision in the hands of the parliamentary majority (or a coalition).

Tihipko has an opportunity to "cash in" in the short term, extracting the best package from one of the campaigns. But, a strength of his campaign was his ability to avoid clear identification with either camp. If Tihipko thinks longer-term, he might be better off heading his own party in the next parliamentary election (which may come sooner rather than later). This strategy has greater risks - his star may not continue to rise as he engages in the messy politics in Kyiv - but has potentially great rewards. If he maintains his image as an "independent" voice and strong leader, he could fare much better in the next presidential contest. Five years is an eternity in politics, especially in Ukraine, which is why politicians typically seem to favor short-term benefits.

Thoughts on the Runoff

2010-01-23T04:45:00.016-06:00

On my return to the US, I was contemplating the data that I would want/need to conduct a systematic assessment of the upcoming runoff between Viktor Yanukovych and Yuliya Tymoshenko. Most valuable would be solid public opinion data that perhaps oversampled supporters of losing candidates, and those who did not vote, to assess their likely behavior in round 2. But, I do not have access to these data. However, in the grand, centuries-old tradition of blogging, I will not let the absence of these data deter my analysis and commentary.

I have compiled, as a starting point, election results from the Central Electoral Commission at the national and regional levels. While I plan to acquire and assess precinct-level data, that is a more time-consuming task. In the short-run, I am focusing on data aggregated at the oblast level. A caveat before I continue: the analysis of data at this level of aggregation runs afoul of the ecological inference problem. Indeed, the behavior I am interested in assessing is at the individual-level, but the data are at a higher level of aggregation. A second caveat, always applied to projections of second-round contests, is that the composition of voters may change. In fact, changing the composition of voters is to the campaigns' advantages, as I will argue below. With these caveats in mind, here is some preliminary analysis.

While all of the ballots have not been included in the tally, the results are unlikely to change significantly (although they will change slightly). According to the data from the CEC, Yanukovych claimed 35.32%, Tymoshenko 25.05%, Tihipko 13.06%, Yatseniuk 6.96%, Yushchenko 5.45%, and the remaining 13 candidates and against all picking up the rest of the valid ballots. All of the losers are players, to one degree or another, in round 2, but Tihipko is in a particularly strong position to negotiate terms with both camps.

Using the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology's polling from a few weeks before the first round, I performed a little thought experiment. The KIIS poll asked likely voters for all candidates who they would support in a round 2 matchup between Yanukovych and Tymoshenko. For many minor candidates the number of respondents indicating support was small, rendering their answers on this question problematic (for example, if two people indicated support for candidate Protivsikh, and one supported Yanukovych in hypothetical round 2 and the other Tymoshenko, it could be problematic to project a 50-50 split in the Protivsikh vote). In addition, the poll was taken well before the round 1 moratorium and positions may change. Nevertheless, it is an interesting starting point to consider.

I used the preferences of respondents to estimate how votes could break in round 2. Yuliya begins with a 2.5 million vote gap. Support from losers narrows the gap by 500,000 (that is, Yuliya picks up a higher proportion of votes from losers than Yanukovych), but the estimates still leave roughly 4.2 million voters (around 17%) from round 1 unallocated. Of particular note, based on the KIIS survey results, Yanukovych takes more Tihipko supporters than Tymoshenko. But, nearly 40% of Tihipko's supporters did not express a preference.

In addition, I compiled data from the presidential election, as well as the last two parliamentary contests, and used ArcGIS to generate various maps displaying the results. You may click on the maps for larger versions.

This map displays Yanukovych's performance across the country, with oblasts color-coded by .15 increments. The choice of increments can exert a strong effect on the way we interpret maps, and I may generate some different versions in later posts. There are few surprises here, with Yanukovych performing well in the east, especially Donetsk and Luhansk. Perhaps his relatively weaker performance in Dnipropetrovsk is a surprise, at first glance, but this is an issue that I will return to momentarily.

Tymoshenko's results are also unsurprising. She performed well in the west, especially Volyn and Vinnystia. Her strongest regional performances fall below Yanukovych, a point which could prove to be advantageous in round 2.

The third-place finisher, Sergey Tihipko, showed several areas of strength. Most notably, he placed well in Dnipropetrovsk and Odesa, as well as in Kyiv, Kharkiv, Zaporizka, and Sevastopol. Please note that his performance is displayed in .05 increments. Two more maps, for Arseniy Yatseniuk and Viktor Yushchenko:

Like Tihipko, Yatseniuk's performance is displayed in smaller increments (Yushchenko is in .15 increments due to his performance in the west). Yatseniuk had some strength in Chernivtsy and Ivano-Frankivsk, and Yushchenko did well in L'viv, Ternopil, and Ivano-Frankivsk.

Now, some thoughts for both campaigns.

Mobilize core voters. While this is an obvious recommendation, it is particularly important because round 2 may be close. Not only do both campaigns need to energize voters who showed up to the polls, but they also need to engage voters who did not. Tymoshenko might face a greater challenge regarding the latter. Western oblasts had relatively high turnout. Yanukovych might be able to make gains increasing turnout in Odesa, Crimea, Kirovohrad, and Mykolaivsk (and perhaps in Kherson and Zakarpattya also). Tymoshenko may be able to benefit from higher turnout in Chernivets - a region that disproportionately supported Yatseniuk and had second-to-lowest regional turnout. But, the population of Chernivets is low compared to regions where Yanukovych may benefit from mobilization.
De-mobilize potential voters for the opposition. Some of this strategy depends on how the campaigns perceive voter preferences among supporters of Yatseniuk and Yushchenko. If they are perceived as having anti-Yuliya attitudes, but even stronger anti-Yanukovych attitudes, then the Tymoshenko campaign benefits from some conciliatory gestures. Yanukovych benefits from reminding them how much they dislike Yuliya. If these voters are generally perceived as anti-Yuliya (especially Yushchenko voters given the personal animosity between the two), then Yanukovych benefits from attempting to mobilize them, and Yuliya benefits from de-mobilizing them.
Get Tihipko Voters. Tihipko has many options to consider. It is unclear how loyal his supporters may be, so his endorsement may or may not bring these voters along. But, his supporters were strong in especially important areas. The following maps show how support for Tymoshenko and Yanukovych changed between 2006 and 2010, as well as 2007 and 2010. Another caveat: I am comparing parliamentary election results with presidential ones. The decision-making algorithm for voters, as well as the choice set, probably differs. But, the personalistic nature of parties and campaigns renders this comparison not wholly unreasonable.

These maps show Yanukovych's changes in fortune between the the parliamentary elections and the first round of the presidential contest. Note especially Yanukovych losses in Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizka.

Similar to the Yanukovych maps, the Tymoshenko maps reveal some losses in areas of Tihipko gain (again, Dnipropetrovsk looms large).

Expect to see strong efforts to gain Dnipropetrovsk from both campaigns. In addition, the Kyiv region, Kharkiv, Kherson, Odesa, and Zaporizka could be strongly contested.
Picking up votes. For Yanukovych, Yuliya's potential to pick up votes from competitors in the West is a potential problem. In Yuliya's best region (Volyn), she beat Yanukovych by 44 points. In Yanukovych's best region, he beat Tymoshenko by 72 points. This map shows the gap between the candidates. Regions leaning to Yanukovych are reflected by positive values.

Yanukovych's top competitors were not as strong as Yuliya's in their respective regions of strength. But, while Yanukovych has less to gain in terms of the percentage of voters that he might acquire from competitors, his areas of strength have substantially larger populations.

As in most elections, mobilization will be a key task for both campaigns. As I have noted before, however, the specter of fraud haunts the election as well. More commentary on that issue, as well as Tihipko's options will follow.

Quality of Election Administration, Part 5

2010-01-18T07:54:00.003-06:00

International observers praised the election, with the OSCE noting that administration met "most" international standards. In the post-Soviet region, this is indeed high praise. The EU delegation also praised the election's quality, with a member of the European Parliament indicating that Ukraine is "...closer to the West, to the EU, than I thought."

The campaigns continue to allege falsification, with Aleksandr Turchinov from the Tymoshenko campaign office claiming that 6% was shifted (3% away from her, 3% added to Yanukovych). Yanukovych supporters demonstrated and celebrated at the CEC offices.

Second Round Issues

2010-01-18T02:03:00.001-06:00

Two-round systems present challenging dynamics for campaigns. The first round must be taken seriously, even by leading candidates, lest they meet the same fate as Lionel Jospin in France's 2002 presidential election (to be fair to Jospin, his problem had more to do with a split leftist vote than lack of attention). But, the leading candidates can't expend too many resources as they must ensure that they retain the ability to fight and win the second round battle. At the same time, they have to curry favor with minor candidates to extract support - and potentially supporters - in the second round, and mobilize their core voters to come to the polls for the decisive vote. Both the Yanukovych and Tymoshenko campaigns have to carefully assess the answers to several questions as they proceed:

How can they ensure that their supporters turn out in the second round? Turnout was lower in 2010 than in other elections, but this may be partly due to falsification in earlier contests. Core supporters seem likely to return to the polls. But, how can they mobilize new supporters (and undermine turnout by opponents' supporters)?
How costly are endorsements from the first round losers? To curry favor with other politicians, they have to get something in return.
How much benefit do first round losers bring? While some first round losers performed well, especially Tihipko, the campaigns must assess if the losers have mobilizational leverage among their voters to convince many to participate in the second round and vote in a particular manner. If voters would naturally gravitate to one of the candidates, the campaigns have to assess if they worth buying off (e.g., Petro Symonenko supporters are likely to choose Yanukovych in large numbers. Symonenko's support is likely to be less valuable - and less costly - than other candidates' endorsements).

Results are Coming In

2010-01-18T02:01:00.003-06:00

Results are still being counted, but outcome yields no big surprises (official CEC results are here). With 78% of the vote finalized, Yanukovych leads with 36%, followed by Tymoshenko with 25%. [UPDATE: No real change with 95% counted: Yanukovych now has 35%, Tymoshenko 25%, and Tihipko 13%. Turnout is reported to be 66.7%] Sergey Tihipko indeed surged, but did not approach surviving into the second round. He will be a major player, however, as the two front-runners prepare for the February 7th runoff.

These results track closely with exit polls released right after voting ended. The geographic distribution is also as anticipated, with Yanukovych taking the east and south, and Tymoshenko dominating in the west and center. The only exception is the Zakarpatska region, where the SDPU(o) was dominant historically, supported Yanukovych. I will review the spatial distribution of votes once the final results are in, as they may give us valuable information for round 2.

My internet access is still down, so updates will be sporadic until my return to the US later this week.

Election Day Update

2010-01-17T07:47:00.003-06:00

The contentious end to the campaign has continued on election day, with the Tymoshenko and Yanukovych camps trading accusations about efforts commit fraud (more here). In addition, a controversy about voting at home using the mobile ballot box has intensified.

At the moment, the CEC is posting updated turnout figures, based on 3:00 p.m. reporting from the polling sites. Turnout was 16.2% at 11:00 a.m. and is reported to be 39.47 at 3:00 p.m. (although it is not quite yet 3:00 here. The value may be based on partial results and will be updated as more electoral commissions report in).

I will continue to post updates as Internet access allows. My apartment's cable and Internet inexplicably went out 36 hours ago (supposedly the whole building is out). The provider claims to be working on the problem, but I have seen no evidence yet.

Quality of Election Administration, Part 4

2010-01-15T12:01:00.004-06:00

The campaign moratorium begins tomorrow (Saturday), and campaigns are lobbing their final barbs at one another, and holding rallies tonight. The Yanukovych affair is a few blocks away from my apartment at the square outside St. Sophia's. It features a full menu of Ukrainian pop music that I do not enjoy (to be fair, some Ukrainian acts are quite good, but they are not at this gig), and a brief speech from the candidate. His performance on last night's Shuster program was lackluster and a bit unfocused. He has been on message during the campaign, but seems more comfortable with prepared texts.

Earlier today, I attended a press conference from the major Ukrainian NGO the Committee of Voters of Ukraine. The CVU has been at the forefront of training election workers and monitoring election administration. The basic message was that the quality of election administration and the campaign has shown substantial progress and massive, systematic fraud is unlikely. Rather, the bigger problems are inadequate financing of the election, lack of professionalism among some lower-level electoral commissions, and the overly political character of decisions coming from the CEC.

Quality of Election Administration, Part 3

2010-01-14T21:54:00.003-06:00

The drama about the registration of 2,011 observers from Georgia continues, with a court ruling that the CEC registration denial was improper (UPDATE: the CEC plans to appeal). Reuters and other news agencies have also reported on opportunities to buy and sell votes online. You can read some of the ads yourself here on the craigslist of Ukraine (in Russian). Prices range from 200 grivnya ($25) to over 1000 ($125). Vote buying has a long tradition (Cox and Kousser's 1981 article on vote fraud in the United States notes that newspapers published the going rate for votes). But, with no real mechanism to guarantee the vote, and a relatively high cost in the advertisements, this method of vote buying/selling is unlikely to be a widespread problem. But, it makes good copy.

More Polling Data

2010-01-14T21:34:00.003-06:00

Unfortunately, much of the commentary on Ukraine's politics (including some of my own) is based on impressions rather than more rigorous data analysis. The tendency to tea-leaf reading is a tradition in the study of the region, and is propelled by poor access to good data. The Pew Global Attitudes Project has just published results of a September 2009 survey that provides some insights into political dynamics in Ukraine. The survey confirms the findings of locally-managed surveys on the low popularity of the incumbent president, as well as conventional wisdom about the public's fatigue with the current state of politics. Notably, the multiparty system and capitalism experienced a drop in support from 1991-2009 (42 points for the multiparty system, 16 for capitalism). In addition, 69% of respondents supported "a strong leader" and 20% democratic government (of course, the two are not wholly incompatible). In 1991, 57% supported democratic government. While the differences may be due, in part, to the time points (the collapse of the communist system at on one end and the current economic crisis on the other may produce more extreme expressions of attitudes), the results correspond with local observations about public preferences for stability and decisive leadership in Kyiv.

Is Tihipko Surging?

2010-01-14T05:07:00.004-06:00

The New York Times reports on "surprising gains" by Sergey Tihipko in recent days. Since publication of Ukrainian polls is not allowed because of the proximity to election day, this report relies on Russia's VTsIOM agency. While once an independent polling firm run by Yuriy Levada, the new VTsIOM has been branded as part of the Kremlin machine. While I do not have access to the raw data and cannot independently assess the poll, I suspect that it overstates Tihipko's gains. Although he was trending upward in Ukrainian polls, he was not on pace to catch Tymoshenko. But, we only have to wait until Monday to find out...

Political Consultants

2010-01-13T21:59:00.000-06:00

It is well known in Ukraine and the US that foreign political consultants - especially Americans - are behind the scenes of the major campaigns. After Viktor Yanukovych's failure to become president in 2004, he began working with Paul Manafort, a consultant who worked with many Republican candidates (including Kansas' own Bob Dole). The 2010 election also features advisers from the Obama campaign working for Yuliya Tymoshenko, and advisers from the Clinton campaign working for Viktor Yushchenko.

Some campaigns have failed to engage with good PR specialists, however. Arseniy Yatsenyuk is a young politician whose star was on the rise. His stint as speaker of parliament was marred by his inability to herd Ukrainian cats (please note: Slavs in fact train cats although they have not yet made the Only In Ukraine blog...). He has recently fallen prey to a Michael Dukakis syndrome, trying to portray himself in ways that do not match his skills and abilities. While he has not been filmed in a tank, awkward tractor driving and bare-chested poses are ill-suited. The Kyiv Post article linked above attributes the Yatseniuk's errors to Russian political consultants who opted to portray him as a "military-style leader."

Quality of Election Administration, Part 2

2010-01-13T21:21:00.003-06:00

The rhetoric on fraud has heated up. Tymoshenko has raised concerns about efforts at massive vote theft using mobile ballot boxes, especially in the east. Yanukovych turned Shakespearean for his reply: "a guilty mind betrays itself.") (see the BBC and Reuters versions of the story as well as the Jamestown Foundation's assessment. Also, see Henry VI, Part 3, Act 5, Scene 6 for Yanukovych's source material). President Yushchenko made more thoughtful and measured comments on the same subject at a press conference. Part three of this post will probably come sooner rather than later.

A Counter-factual

2010-01-13T13:21:00.005-06:00

On tonight's Savik Shuster program, candidate Sergiy Tigipko was asked if he would have won the 2004 presidential election if he had been the establishment candidate instead of Viktor Yanukovych. His answer echoes conventional wisdom, even at the time: yes. Of course, as a counter-factual perhaps a less definitive answer is needed (maybe, but leaning positively).

Tigipko has a strong profile: he was Vice-Premier for Economics in Pavlo Lazarenko's government, Minister of Economics in Viktor Yushchenko's government, elected an MP on the "For United Ukraine" list in 2002, and director of the Central Bank. He led Viktor Yanukovych's failed campaign in 2004, and left politics after that defeat. When he joined the election campaign in 2009, some suggested that he would be a technical candidate for Yuliya Tymoshenko. But, he has run a credible campaign.

To sum it up, Tigipko has been associated with all major contenders - and sides - but has been out of politics over the last five years. He has credible outsider credentials, and also is capable of projecting a strong public image. But, with poll numbers well below Tymoshenko (half or less), he is unlikely to catch up even though his trajectory was ticking upward. His name should pop up in the second round as he is courted - by both camps - perhaps with a cabinet position or as a potential prime minister down the line.

Quality of Election Administration, Part 1

2010-01-12T21:06:00.005-06:00

I anticipate that the issue of election quality - and accusations of fraud - will be a regular theme during both rounds. Many campaigns have alleged that improprieties will occur in 2010. The Yanukovych campaign, via an analysis by its political consultants from Manafort (more on this later), identified regions in the western part of the country where they warn of potential fraud. The Tymoshenko campaign has just criticized a Central Electoral Commission decision to deny credentials to a couple of thousand Georgians.

Based on my conversations with political observers over the past couple of days, the denial stems from decisions by actors on both sides of the debate. I was told that the Georgians were planning to stage an observation mission that would heavily oversample the east, implying that they were targeting the Party of Regions. In addition, CEC votes have reflected the "party line" on some issues, with the majority supporting the Party of Regions. Politicized electoral commissions created problems in the last presidential election (and I observed biased decision-making in polling stations that I would attribute to the capture of commissions through technical candidates). Misbehavior at the polls is likely to be more sophisticated and diffuse than in 2004, but both rounds are likely to feature allegations of improper behavior all over the country.

Policy, Office, or Votes?

2010-01-12T06:32:00.001-06:00

President Yushchenko's campaign has reprinted a New Republic article (the original is here) that likens Yuliya Tymoshenko to Evita Peron (or perhaps the reincarnation of Peron). The profile is a mixed bag of insinuations, interpretations, and amateur psychological profiling. While I do not claim to understand Tymoshenko as deeply as the author, the article provokes a few thoughts:

The profile notes that Yuliya's leadership style is not democratic. This observation is hardly a surprise for a politician with an eponymous political party.
Tymoshenko is a populist, and policy positions detailed on her website showcase this tendency. She directs barbs at oligarchs and promises a range of policy outcomes: anti-corruption measures, new technological and industrial development, energy independence, improved education (including free Internet access for all children) and health, poverty reduction (and significant state spending), a European orientation (but a veiled reference to NATO accession only through a referendum), cordial relations with Russia, and an end to a conscription-based armed forces. Like many populists, she makes promises beyond the capacity to pay for them, is associated with the very forces she criticizes, and seems to approach policies opportunistically rather than ideologically.
The profile's characterization of Tymoshenko as a politician pursuing "absolute power" corresponds with the author's concerns that a Tymoshenko victory could lead to a "...short authoritarian experiment..." The failure to manage a party in a democratic manner hardly guarantees that the leader will rule a country in an authoritarian manner. Party organizations vary, with some featuring centralized decision-making that leaves little space for rank-and-file members to influence platform development, nominations, or strategies and others permitting more input from members. While Tymoshenko notes that she opposes constitutional changes that took effect in 2006, reducing the power of the presidency, enhancing presidential power is not equivalent to authoritarianism.

The profile is perhaps over-the-top, but it revolves around a valuable question: what motivates Tymoshenko? A 1999 book by Muller and Strom that shares the title as this post addresses how political parties manage their affairs to achieve their preferred policy outcomes, control government operations, and maintain - or expand - their appeal among citizens. Sometimes the actions needed to maximize performance in one of these areas impedes another. Their book addresses how party leaders manage these challenges. Tymoshenko's career path certainly suggests that office-seeking is a primary motivator. Without consistent policy to serve as a guide, it is unclear what she would pursue next if she were to gain the highest office in the land.

Yushchenko's Rise and Fall

2010-01-11T20:20:00.001-06:00

Ukrainska Pravda published an analysis of Viktor Yushchenko's decline in popularity (link is to the Google translate version; the original is here) focusing on critical events over the last five years. The UP article draws from the Razumkov Center's polling and analysis. and uses responses to the question: "Do you trust the work of Viktor Yushchenko?" that has been tracked since 2002. Respondent's were presented with three options: "fully support," "support individual actions," "do not support," in addition to "do not know [his work]," and "hard to say." The UP assessment focused only on the first response - "fully support" - and traced the dynamics of responses over time.

It may be more useful to look not at full support, but rather both flavors of support together. The graph below presents full and partial support combined (blue), along with dissatisfaction (orange). While the trends that UP points out generally persist, the intensity of change differs. For example, the change in attitudes about Yushchenko reflected in the June-October 2008 results are a small downward blip in the UP article; the decline is more precipitous with full and partial support added together. The increase in "no support" rises to 75.6% of respondents from June-October 2008 - an increase of 20 percentage points from the June 2008 poll. The financial crisis and President Yushchenko's failed bid to hold another early parliamentary election loom large over that period, and could constitute explanatory factors.

More than 50% of respondents trusted Yushchenko in almost all periods prior to and during the Orange Revolution. Since early 2008, trust has dissipated to only 19% in the October 2009 poll. No realistic scenario predicts Yushchenko's re-election. However, rumors have circulated of an agreement between Yushchenko and Yanukovych in which Yushchenko would be nominated for the post of prime minister (as well as receive some policy concessions) in exchange for help challenging Tymoshenko. Yushchenko's lack of popularity suggests that if the agreement were real, Yanukovych has a strong incentive to renege on his end of the bargain. While Yanukovych might benefit from a non-aggression deal with Yushchenko, and perhaps gain support from Yushchenko's administrative resources, Yanukovych gains little from nominating such an unpopular politician to be prime minister.

Moreover, since parliament gained more authority over the appointment of the prime minister after constitutional reforms took effect in 2006, it is not clear that Yushchenko could bring along enough deputies to scuttle the current coalition government and hand over the reins to Yanukovych.

Yanukovych and Wedge Issues

2010-01-11T12:00:00.001-06:00

Last Thursday's Komsomolskaya Pravda in Ukraine published an interesting interview with Viktor Yanukovych. The entire text is here (in Russian). Google Translate produces a serviceable translation for non-Russian speakers. While none of Yanukovych's comments were particularly surprising, he repeats critical talking points: the Orange Revolution produced corruption, the current leadership is not capable of governing, Russian-speakers' rights are restricted, and Ukraine should not pursue NATO membership. The latter two points speak directly to issues he has used in the past to mobilize voters. Below are some comments I found to be interesting or notable.

On election fraud in 2004: "Ведь за прошедшие пять лет после Майдана факт фальсификации выборов так и не был доказан в судах. И это лишь подтверждает, что во втором туре выборов в 2004 году все прошло законно." Yanukovych indicates that the "fact of election falsification has not been proven in court... [and] that in the second round of the election in 2004 everything proceeded lawfully." Interestingly, and perhaps ironically, the Yanukovych campaign has been making the case that fraud may be in the works for the 2010 election - in the western parts of the country favoring his main rival Yuliya Tymoshenko. I have read an analysis, produced by the American political consulting group Davis Manafort, alleging that many polling stations in western Ukraine produced anomalous results detrimental to the Party of Regions and implying that fraud would be employed in the west in 2010. While I do not dispute the potential for fraud in many regions of Ukraine, the evidence supports contentions of fraud in 2004 (even though that evidence may not have been tested in court).
On democracy and the Orange Revolution: "Сегодня «оранжевые» вожди Тимошенко, Ющенко говорят о том, что мы в Украине получили демократию, свободу слова… Хорошо, что мы так продвинулись вперед в вопросах свободы, но что касается демократии… Тут я бы возразил. Потому что демократия - это прежде всего выполнение законов и Конституции." Further in the interview, he asks rhetorically, "What has the Orange Revolution given us? Only freedom of speech? What price has the Ukrainian people paid for this?" Yanukovych's separation of "questions of freedom" from the definition of democracy - and identifying democracy with fulfilling legal requirements - harkens back to Soviet era characterizations of democracy.
On NATO: "Однозначно Украина была и будет внеблоковым государством, таким, каким она является сегодня. Мы не будем стремиться вступать ни в НАТО, ни в ОДКБ. Мы сохраним нейтральный статус." Yanukovych has been consistent in his opposition to NATO membership, noting that Ukraine should remain neutral. Neutrality is not really the objective. Instead, the target is a return to the Leonid Kuchma era "multi-vector" foreign policy which was rather successful in balancing Ukrainian independence, warmer relations with Europe, and civil relations with Russia.
On the status of Russian language: "Первый шаг, который я сделаю, - это принятие закона о языках в парламенте, который предусматривает имплементацию Европейской Хартии региональных языков или языков меньшинств. Это позволит нам снять то напряжение, которое есть в русскоговорящих регионах. Они получат право разговаривать на своем родном языке и применять его в делопроизводстве, в сфере образования, в медицине, в судах. Это главный вопрос, который нужно сейчас решить и который очень серьезно волнует людей." Yanukovych's pledge to pass language legislation will be a real test, especially if he wins the presidency and manages to obtain a parliamentary majority in subsequent elections. In recent elections, his Party of Regions has turned to its bread-and-butter issues to mobilize voters as voting approaches. The most effective issues to engage core supporters have been NATO membership and the status of Russian-language speakers. Enacting and implementing legislation to elevate the status of Russian would remove this seemingly effective mobilization tool.

The View from Kyiv

2010-01-10T21:04:00.003-06:00

Over the next few days, I will be posting observations about Ukraine's presidential campaign and both rounds of the election.

The road from Kyiv-Boryspil Airport to the city's center is lined with campaign advertisements. While the route from the airport does not give a representative sample of advertising, the impressions that one gathers from glancing at the signs can be useful. Yuliya Tymoshenko's image is ubiquitous; Viktor Yanukovych and Viktor Yushchenko were also advertising in force. Fewer billboards supported Sergey Tihipko, Lyudmila Suprun, and the other pretenders to the throne. However, even Vasyl Protivsikh (the recently re-named Vasyl Gumenyuk whose surname now means "Against All") had a few signs along the road. Campaign activity was understated on Maidan Nezalezhnosti, crowds milling around seemed to be more focused on the holiday season. More comments are forthcoming after I begin work on Monday.

Polls in Ukraine

2010-01-02T12:55:00.002-06:00

Beginning today, reports of public opinion polls are prohibited (the law does not permit publication fifteen or fewer days prior to an election). I have not obtained raw polling data to make an independent assessment, but all signs point to Yuliya Tymoshenko and Viktor Yanukovych emerging from the first round on January 17. The Kyiv Post has published results of polling from several agencies that predict Yanukovych to emerge with the most votes in the first round.

As the election approaches, contenders and the media will direct attention to election administration. Some of my Ukrainian colleagues at CIFRA have published an interesting analysis of electoral commission membership that is worth reading (in Russian).

Elections in 2010

2010-01-01T08:25:00.004-06:00

Several countries in the region are planning to hold elections in 2010. Firm (and tentative) dates from IFES' Election Guide follow:

January 10 - Uzbekistan's parliamentary election (Round 2 in 39 districts)
January 17 - Ukraine's presidential election (Round 1)
February 21 - Tajikistan's parliamentary election
October 2 - Latvia's parliamentary election
November 7 - Azerbaijan's parliamentary election
Fall (date TBA) - Moldova's pre-term parliamentary election

Political observers also expect efforts to dissolve Ukraine's parliament and hold early elections after the dust settles from the presidential election.

Uzbekistan's Parliamentary Election

2009-12-31T15:43:00.003-06:00

Uzbekistan held parliamentary elections on Sunday, December 27, 2009 to select deputies for five-year terms. The Central Electoral Commission reports that turnout reached 87.8%. Candidates received a majority in 96 districts, and repeat elections will be held in 39 districts on January 10, 2010. The remaining 15 seats in the recently expanded parliament (increased to 150 seats from 120 last December) are allocated to the new Ecological Movement of Uzbekistan, and at least 30% of seats will be occupied by women due to a gender quota. The CEC has also published excerpts from some assessments of the election. The OSCE declined to participate in election monitoring.

Final results should be certified and published after the second round. While parties have challenged each other in the campaign, they all support President Karimov.

Effects of Election Monitoring via Webcams

2009-12-18T14:32:00.008-06:00

Evgeny Morozov's commentary in Foreign Policy about Azerbaijan's use of webcams to monitor elections has prompted some pessimistic online commentary about the conduct of elections in the region. Indeed, Azerbaijan's election quality has been rated poorly by international organizations that monitor campaigns (with the notable exception of the CIS).

Morozov argues the following about the use of webcams:

I don't know how it would hurt, but I don't see how it would help either: unless there are enough cameras to cover the entire voting/counting areas, rigging the results would still not be too hard. If anything, the presence of a Web cam would probably give yet another excuse to validate the results...

His note focuses on the installation of webcams for upcoming municipal elections. However, webcams were in place for the last presidential election and referendum. I have analyzed turnout and outcome data, differentiating among polling stations that installed webcams and those that did not. Officially reported turnout was consistently lower in polling stations that had webcams. The presence of webcams had a less consistent effect on pro-regime outcomes.

What could produce these results? I speculate that election administrators have a reduced incentive to inflate outcomes - especially turnout - when they are being monitored. Some officials were punished for election violations in Azerbaijan's 2000 and 2005 elections. While these officials were likely scapegoated, their punishment potentially sends a message to administrators that they could share the same fate. Placement of a webcam in a polling station raises the possibility of being punished if the footage shows clear evidence of inappropriate behavior. With static cameras that show one view of the polling station, viewers could identify egregious inflation of turnout if the footage were observed consistently over time.

I address other possibilities, and present the statistical analysis, in a research paper available to anyone who is interested. Please contact me at: eherron at ku.edu and I will forward a copy.

A Long Semester

2009-12-18T14:29:00.003-06:00

While the region has featured some important election developments in the last few months (e.g., controversial regional elections in Russia, Moldova's ongoing saga), my over-committed schedule has not permitted me to post regularly. However, I will be covering Ukraine's presidential election in January from Kyiv, and will be following up with some additional research commentary in the coming weeks.

Preliminary Results

2009-07-30T07:03:00.003-05:00

Moldova's CEC has released the following preliminary results:

Name	PCRM	PPCD	AMN	PL	PLDM	PDM	PSD	PEMAVE
Moldova	704876 (45.07%)	29812 (1.91%)	115288 (7.37%)	224527 (14.36%)	256570 (16.4%)	197206 (12.61%)	29322 (1.87%)	6440 (0.41%)

The PCRM received 49.5% of the vote in the April election, falling off about 5% (or 55,263 votes). Perhaps the most striking difference is the drop in wasted votes. Around 15.2% of all votes cast were allocated to parties that did not pass the threshold in April, compared to 4.2% yesterday. Wasted votes magnified the PCRM's seat acquisition in April.

While the lower threshold in yesterday's election may have influenced the behavior of voters and parties, the number of contestants and distribution of votes tightened rather than increased. Indeed, institutional changes are less likely to have influenced the number of competitive parties than the unusual circumstances of this election and the consequences of the April protests.

If the preliminary results are certified, opposition parties should have 53 seats (and the PCRM 48). This would allow the opposition - if it could work as a cohesive group - to elect a speaker. The PCRM's opponents have a history of discord and strife, however. In my recent book, I sketched a portrait of the Moldovan opposition, noting that it behaved like its kin in many post-Soviet countries. While the opposition is united by a desire to challenge the party-of-power, it is divided on strategy and tactics. This disunity is manifested in a proliferation of parties, often headed by strong personalities, who cannot coordinate long-term cooperation. In cases where the opposition successfully ousts an entrenched government, as in Ukraine, the opposition quickly dissolves into warring factions.

With these results in place, Moldova's opposition coalition would fall well short of the 61 votes needed to select the president. While another early election cannot be held for a year, it is likely that partisan rancor rather than reconciliation is ahead. Victory celebrations may be held in Chisinau today, but the (metaphorical) knives are likely to come out soon as each opposition group tries to carve out its share of the spoils.

Voting Underway in Moldova

2009-07-29T07:08:00.004-05:00

Moldova's re-do of its April parliamentary election is underway. Pre-election polling suggests that the PCRM will not obtain the 60 seats it desires, and that more opposition parties could enter parliament.

The CEC has reported 30% turnout at 12:45 p.m., about 5% higher than turnout was at the same point in the previous election. See Moldpress, Moldova Azi, and Imedia for coverage of election day activities.

Update (7/29 at 10:30 and 4:00): Thanks again to my colleagues at imedia, here is a breakdown of turnout by reporting periods:

April 2009: 6.6% (0945); 27.1% (1245); 43.0% (1545); 52.1% (1845); 59.1 (2145)
July 2009: 10.7% (0945); 30.0% (1245); 40.0% (1545); 49.3% (1845); 58.8 (2145)

Imedia is live-blogging the results in Moldovan and English. Preliminary results give the PCRM the lead. Votes for four other parties currently exceed the 5% threshold.

Kyrgyzstan Presidential "Election" Update

2009-07-24T07:09:00.006-05:00

Preliminary results indicate that incumbent President Kurmanbek Bakiyev received 89% of the vote, allowing him to claim an easy victory in the presidential election when the voting is certified. Citing fraud, Almazbek Atambayev (the leading opposition candidate) withdrew from competition on election day along with another minor contestant. Two members of parliament associated with his party were arrested, sparking a protest that was repressed by the use of substantial force. Officials have annulled the results of at least one precinct, noting problems with vote administration. The usual suspects declared that the election met international standards (CIS, SCO), while the OSCE criticized the quality of the campaign and the process of casting and counting ballots.

The Central Electoral Commission website is currently non-responsive. I have encountered problems with this site in the past; it is possible that the relatively high volume of traffic has temporarily shut it down. If data become available, I will post additional observations.

Polling in Moldova

2009-07-17T10:23:00.002-05:00

A recent poll, conducted by the Association of Moldovan Sociologists and Demographers and assessed by imedia, suggests that the upcoming election could once again yield a PCRM plurality, but not a majority. According to the poll, respondents indicated the following preferences:

PCRM: 29.7%

Liberal Party: 13.3%

Liberal Democratic Party: 12.8%

Our Moldova: 7.9%

Democratic Party: 7.1%

Other parties: under 3%

Remaining respondents were undecided.

As imedia notes, polls prior to the previous election also yielded a high proportion of undecided respondents. Comparing polling results to the election outcomes, it appears that the PCRM disproportionately attracted undecided voters.

With the possible entry of four opposition parties to parliament, Moldova may be headed toward an ongoing governance crisis like its neighbor, Ukraine, or toward some kind of grand compromise. Acting President Vladimir Voronin's rhetoric points to both possibilities. While he has called the opposition "radical right-wing parties," Voronin has also claimed that the opposition's "ideology" has been changing to promote Moldova's interests and that a coalition could be possible. The overall tone of the campaign, and events in the spring, suggest that ongoing crisis is more likely than compromise, however.

Thanks again to imedia for extensive information on Moldova.

Bad Omens

2009-07-13T10:39:00.001-05:00

As late July elections in Kyrgyzstan and Moldova approach, disturbing developments have surfaced in several post-Soviet states.

In Azerbaijan, two young pro-democracy activists were beaten and detained. Harassment of the opposition is not unprecedented, but this attack occurred publicly in a popular restaurant. The official version of events has changed, while the attackers have been released and the activists were tried and convicted on the charge of hooliganism. Several youth movements have used the Internet to challenge - and poke fun at - the government. Open challenges to government authority have been met with repression in the past, but expressions of dissent seem to be tolerated to a greater extent than in several other post-Soviet societies.

This provocation raises the possibility that opposition to authority will be met with harsher responses. A direct link to events in Iran is unlikely, but the capacity of the opposition to mobilize protesters in Azerbaijan's southern neighbor may have raised alarms in Baku and encouraged authorities to send a strong message to potential opponents.
While Kyrgyzstan's incumbent president Kurmanbek Bakiyev faces a legitimate challenger in the Social Democratic Party's Almaz Altanbayev, he is nevertheless expected to win. Opposition editors (1, 2) and journalists (1, 2) have been targeted in attacks that may be politically motivated. In addition, while Bakiyev has been courting religious voters, but some have allegedly been targeted as dissenters.
My imedia contact in Moldova has identified many important developments as the snap parliamentary election approaches. First, the election law has been modified, lowering the threshold from 6% to 5%, and lowering the turnout requirement from 50% (+1) to 33%. Second, the election is scheduled to take place on a work day (Wednesday, July 29). Moldovan elections are typically held on Sundays. Third, no more than nine parties (and no independents running) will contest. Actiunea Europeana just withdrew, and other parties could also drop out. None of this is disturbing news, and some of it - such as the reduction in the threshold - could be beneficial to pluralism.

However, the campaign atmosphere has been stacked against the opposition, with state TV supporting the PCRM. My contact notes that the"...narrative is that [the opposition] tried to stage a coup with Romanian support and that if people don't vote for the Party of Communists, Moldova as a country will disappear." The opposition has failed to coordinate its challenge to the PCRM once again, rendering it at least partially culpable in its likely defeat. Some polling is due to be released, and I will comment more on Moldova's election as information becomes available.

While I Was Out

2009-06-08T07:57:00.000-05:00

After my research trip to Lithuania, I traveled to Georgia and Kazakhstan. While I was unable to blog during my trip, political developments related to elections surfaced across the region.

1) The most notable development was the failure of Moldova's parliament to elect a president, forcing new elections. Frankly, I was surprised at the resolve of the opposition; only one defector would have secured the presidential post for the PCRM. Presumably, the rewards offered to a defector were great. But, the opposition also galvanized and made clear that defectors would be identified (If an opposition member were to defect, this action would be revealed by the MP entering the voting booth). The new election is likely to be quite contentious, with allegations of wrongdoing by the losers a guarantee. As I noted in a previous post, evidence of massive fraud was absent from the precinct-level data, based on my assessment. The opposition wants better control over voter lists to ensure that "dead souls" do not cast ballots. The battle over election administration will heat up over the coming weeks. In addition, as my imedia contact noted, the elections are likely to take place in the late summer or early fall. After this early election, parliament cannot be dissolved for a year. Barring a change in fortunes for one or more parties, the new elections may force the PCRM and opposition to bargain more seriously. Alternatively, Moldova will enter into a state of perpetual political crisis like its neighbor, Ukraine.

2) The party-of power won the hotly contested Yerevan council race, allowing it to win the mayoral seat. Mayoral positions, especially in post-Soviet capital cities, are important staging areas for politicians to launch national political careers. In addition, mayors generally determine who has the right to assemble, and hold sway over municipal police. Levon Ter-Petrossian, the former president and failed candidate in the last election was also unsuccessful in this contest. He and his allies allege that fraud was the primary reason for their loss.

3) European parliamentary elections were held in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and all other constituent members of the EU. Turnout varied across the Baltic states: Estonia's turnout jumped from 26.8% in 2004 to 43.2% in 2009; Latvia's increased from 41.3% to 52.6%; and Lithuania's plummeted from 48.4% to 20.9%. The financial crisis may have encouraged the increased turnout in Estonia and Latvia. The resolution of Lithuania's presidential election in the first round probably depressed turnout; the second round would have been scheduled for the same day as the EU poll. Six Baltic seats went to the European People's Party (Christian Democrats) and European Democrats (1 Estonia, 1 Latvia, 4 Lithuania); four to the Socialist Group (1 Estonia, 3 Lithuania), six to the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats (3 Estonia, 1 Latvia, 2 Lithuania), five to the Union of Europe of the Nations (3 Latvia, 2 Lithuania), one to the Greens (Latvia), and four to other groups (1 Estonia, 2 Latvia, 1 Lithuania). More information is available on the EU's election site.

4) Protests against Mikheil Saakashvili continued in Georgia, with the opposition demanding his resignation and early presidential and parliamentary elections. During my visit to Tbilisi, I visited the protest site around parliament several times, and was able to speak with some regime opponents. My general sense - based not on scientific data analysis but rather impressions - is that dissatisfaction is deep, but no clear preference for an alternative leader exists. The protest site was occupied during the day, but only a handful of protesters quietly monitored the "cells." Regular evening protest events are more lively, and the opposition has mobilized large numbers in some protest actions. But, the inertia to oust Misha seems to be limited. While people are unhappy, the precedent of removing the president in this manner would likely set off a destructive cycle of protests by election losers.

5) Seven candidates were approved for the July presidential election in Kyrgyzstan, and eleven were rejected.

6) While there were no major election issues during my stay in Kazakhstan, I noted an interesting article in a local newspaper. As Kazakhstan prepares for its presidency of the OSCE beginning in 2010, it has begun staking out its plan for reform. Watch for challenges to the status quo on election observation missions.

7) Ukrainian politicians continue to fight over possible coalition arrangements while positioning themselves for the upcoming presidential election. More on this issue later.

Delaying the Vote

2009-05-28T04:45:00.003-05:00

The showdown in Moldova was slated for today. However, according to my imedia contact, the PCRM met briefly and claimed that on a religious holiday (Ascension) politicians "should not be fighting." The vote was rescheduled for June 3. Clearly, the PCRM has not been able to woo any opposition deputy, an impressive show of resolve by the opposition. My imedia contact noted that the opposition has barred its deputies from entering the voting booth, effectively "outing" any defector if one were to appear. While the PCRM promises to negotiate with the opposition, no clear lines of negotiation have emerged, nor have any compromise solutions. As was the case several days ago, the PCRM lacks only one vote to elect the president, and the opposition hopes to hold out for new elections (or at least a better deal).

Mayoral Election in Yerevan

2009-05-21T07:48:00.003-05:00

In ten days, Armenia's capital city will host an interesting race: the thwarted presidential candidate, and ex-president, Lev Ter-Petrossian, will face off against the government's preferred candidate, and incumbent mayor, Gagik Beglarian. Onnik Krikorian, at the Caucasian Knot, has an interesting post on the upcoming contest.

UPDATE (5/22/09): The analysis connecting local elections to disputes among coalition partners on Eurasianet.org is worth a read.

Moldova Update

2009-05-20T06:11:00.004-05:00

Moldova's president is elected by parliament, and requires 61 votes to secure the seat. While the PCRM dominated the parliamentary vote, it only obtained 60 seats. Vladimir Voronin, the former president, gained the powerful post of parliamentary speaker after the most recent election.

The opposition has thus far held firm and denied the PCRM's presidential candidates (the PCRM nominated two in the first round because the rules require a contested race). Not one deputy has defected or been bought out. The real showdown will be on May 28 ~~in a contest with new candidates (the losing candidates in this round cannot run again)~~ [CORRECTION - Losing candidates may contest again]. If no candidate wins, Voronin will be required to dissolve parliament and call a new election. The stakes will be high over the next eight days, and opposition deputies are likely to be tempted with an assortment of rewards for supporting the PCRM candidate.

Thanks to imedia for news and analysis used in this post.

Ukraine's Presidential Election Restored

2009-05-20T05:20:00.005-05:00

Faction leaders have agreed to restore the January 17, 2010 date for Ukraine's presidential election. Barring unforeseen complications, never out of the realm of possibilities, President Yushchenko's preferred date is confirmed.

The Results are In

2009-05-17T09:00:00.006-05:00

Overnight, Lithuania's CEC completed the count of over 98% of the ballots. Turnout rose from just under 50% to 51.67%. Dalia Grybauskaite has claimed 68.17% of the ballots. Her closest rival, Algirdas Butkevicius, received 11.70%. If the results are finalized, and no court challenges emerge, she will be the first female president of Lithuania.

At the election night event I attended, the commentary and analysis of the candidates suggested that Grybauskaite is viewed as "above" some of the local squabbles and is a skilled manager, especially due to her experience as EU budget commissioner. However, the most vexing problems for Lithuania - the economic crisis and the impending power problems with the closure of the Ignalina nuclear power plant - are matters that the president has less authority to manage. While the president can affect domestic policies, her portfolio is more strongly oriented toward foreign affairs.

Turnout in Lithuania

2009-05-17T08:48:00.006-05:00

Lithuania's presidential election rules require a candidate to win a majority of votes to claim the post in the first round. However, if turnout falls below 50%, a second provision requires a winning candidate to claim at least 33% of all voters. Article 74 of the Law on Presidential Elections notes:

6. A candidate to the office of President of the Republic shall be considered elected if during voting for the first time in which at least half of all voters participate, he receives more than half of the votes of all voters participating in the elections. If less than half of all voters participated in the elections, a candidate to the office of President of the Republic shall be considered elected when he receives the most, but no less than one-third of votes of all voters.

As of 2pm, turnout was 26.57% nationally. In a polling station I visited today in Vilnius, turnout was around one-third at 3pm. The prospect of exceeding 50%, with polls closing at 7pm, seems grim. If turnout is low, the likelihood of a second round increases substantially.

UPDATE (11:oo pm Vilnius Time): Apparently, Lithuanians prefer to vote in the afternoon. The final preliminary turnout is just a hair under 50% - 49.69%. If these results are certified, a second round is almost a certainty. If the final turnout creeps above 50%, Grybauskaite will win in round 1. ANOTHER UPDATE: My interpretation of the turnout data was slightly errant. The precincts reported one hour before closing.

Election Eve in Vilnius

2009-05-16T15:04:00.006-05:00

I arrived in Lithuania today, on the eve of the presidential election (early voting has begun, but the main day for casting ballots is tomorrow). Campaign advertisements have already been cleaned off bulletin boards around town, although a few strays remain. The streets of Vilnius are quiet, and the election is also expected to be a relatively quiet affair.

Several candidates planned to run for president, but only seven gained ballot access. The leader in reported polling is Dalia Grybauskaite, an EU Commissioner. While the sample selection in the most widely reported poll could be biased (as it seems small and focuses on urban areas), Grybauskaite's lead is substantial. While she has faced some challenges to her eligibility, this election campaign is less charged than the 2004 election that followed Rolandas Paksas' impeachment. Barring a Literary Digest-style fiasco, she is likely to win the most votes tomorrow. If she does not win outright, the second round will be held on June 7 along with European parliamentary elections.

On Again Off Again

2009-05-14T10:20:00.005-05:00

Ukraine's Constitutional Court overturned the Rada's decision to hold the next presidential election in October 2009. The date had been set for early 2010 initially, but parliament moved up the election date by passing a resolution. President Yushchenko challenged the decision in court, and the Constitutional Court's ruling adds to the already intense fighting among rivals in Kyiv. Discussions about simultaneous presidential and early parliamentary elections are again on the table.

Post-Soviet Elections at the Monkey Cage

2009-05-12T14:42:00.003-05:00

The Monkey Cage, a blog that comments on a wide range of issues in political science, has added Joshua Tucker as a regular participant. Josh is well known for his excellent work on elections in the post-communist region, and he just posted a provocative entry on election fraud. In particular, it raises important questions about how fraud is coordinated, and why fraud is often massive. I am working on a project that will weigh in on this issue, and will post more about it in the future.

Several Updates

2009-05-02T08:50:00.005-05:00

End of semester tasks have prevented me from posting lately. But, elections continue in the region. Updates include:

1) In Georgia, protesters continue to demonstrate against President Saakashvili, calling for early elections. See stories from Reuters, Eurasianet (here and here), Georgian Times, and Svobodnaya Gruziya.
2) In Russia, United Russia's candidate won the contested race for mayor of Sochi amid allegations of fraud. However, Garri Kasparov cleverly stole the spotlight. See stories from Lenta.ru, New York Times, and RFE/RL.
3) In Moldova, the recount confirmed the final results, with some minor changes in votes. The opposition continues to challenge the validity of voter lists. The amended results are available here.
4) In Kyrgyzstan, the party-of-power (Ak Zhol) has nominated Kurmanbek Bakiyev for a new term in the early presidential election scheduled for July 2009.

The Lithuanian presidential election approaches, along with the mayoral election in Yerevan. I plan to be in-country on election day, and will post from Vilnius.

Interrogating the Data

2009-04-14T20:09:00.006-05:00

My good friend and colleague, Valentin Mikhailov, has reminded me that the main issue with election fraud is not its presence, but rather its scale. Systematic error - of origins both sinister and benign - is a common component of elections. While several political scientists have weighed in on methods to identify fraud, notably Walter Mebane, Misha Myagkov, and Peter Ordeshook, at best researchers can uncover data anomalies that are most plausibly explained by vote manipulation. As Mark Nigrini noted, forensic accountants tend to rely on a series of "data interrogation tests" to uncover improprieties. Even then, the existence of an anomaly does not reveal its cause.

When I evaluate precinct-level election data, I pay close attention to the performance of pro-regime parties, turnout, invalid ballots, and if available, other features like mobile ballot box use. In addition, I compare the distribution of digits to a Benford-type distribution. Several decades ago, Frank Benford re-discovered an interesting property of digits in naturally occurring datasets: ones are the most common first digit, with the probability of a digit being first declining logarithmically. His work has informed the accounting literature, as well as political science. Unfortunately, some properties of election data undermine the application of Benford's Law, such as the presence of zeros (Benford does not account for a zero as the first and only digit), and precinct size (precinct size varies, and it determines the "available" digits). Despite these complications, I have compared data from other post-Soviet states to the Benford distribution and found interesting results, especially in Ukraine.

While I have not performed a full and systematic analysis of the data (having only acquired it last night), the initial scan of data suggests that there is no "smoking gun." The first and second digit Benford test on the results for the PCRM reveals no major issues. While the number of ones is low (significantly lower than anticipated by Benford), the distribution of PCRM first and second digits is not statistically different from the Benford-type distribution. The PCRM performs exceptionally well in several precincts: it received above 90% in eleven precincts. But, no precincts report 100% for the PCRM (in many questionable elections, I have found precincts with regime support at 100%). Some precincts report extremely high turnout, based largely on voters added through a supplemental list (some of these are polling places outside of the country in embassies or consulates). In these precincts, the average vote for the PCRM was 35% - below what it received nationally. The rate of invalid ballots is not high (the mean is just above 1%). The highest invalidation rate was 9%; the PCRM received 43% of the vote in that precinct.

Tomorrow's recount will be an interesting, and unprecedented, exercise in the post-Soviet world. The opposition has decided to boycott the recount, instead hoping to have voter lists re-evaluated. The opposition claims that "dead souls" and other illegitimate persons were on the voter lists, allowing the PCRM to inflate its results. Based on the precinct-level data that has been released, evidence of large-scale ballot box stuffing is not strong.

Countdown to the Recount

2009-04-13T20:45:00.003-05:00

Moldova's Constitutional Court authorized a recount of the parliamentary election, which is now scheduled to take place on Wednesday. On a related note, the CEC has made precinct-level data available, and I plan to acquire and take a look at the information soon.

Repression in Moldova

2009-04-11T07:21:00.002-05:00

Several unpublished imedia reports note that the political opposition is being quietly repressed. While it can be difficult to separate rumor from fact, news agencies (imedia cites Unimedia) and NGOs (Amnesty International) have reported arrests of young people, or threats of harassment. Stories broadcasting evidence of abuse and the allegations of victims are on YouTube.

In addition, the use of Twitter and other methods to mobilize protesters has been undermined by spamming and contradictory messages. Further complicating matters, imedia also indicates that reporters from several international media agencies such as the BBC, Associated Press, and Reuters, as well as Romanian news outlets, have been denied entry into Moldova. Some reporters in Moldova have been detained.

Nicu Popescu's blog provides ongoing discussion of events.

[Thanks to imedia for several reports on events in Moldova.]

Chisinau and Tbilisi

2009-04-10T06:49:00.003-05:00

In response to protest activities, President Voronin has called for a recount of Sunday's parliamentary vote. This decision would be rendered more transparent by public release of precinct-level data. It is interesting to note that links to turnout and voting data are no longer active on the CEC website. While protests have been scheduled for today in Chisinau, early activity is light , with no protesters assembled by mid-morning. Looking to the south, the opposition has increased its activities in Georgia, staging a large protest to call for an early presidential election (also see Eurasianet's story).

Protests Escalate in Moldova

2009-04-07T07:53:00.002-05:00

In a scene reminiscent of Georgian protesters' occupation of parliament in 2003 and Kyrgyz protesters' takeover of the presidential administration building in 2005, Moldovan protesters attacked parliament to express their deep dissatisfaction with Sunday's election. An unpublished imedia report suggests that the opposition has not planned major protests, but may "organize 'mass protests' soon," perhaps spurred on by the demonstrations on Monday and Tuesday. Several sources, including imedia, suggest that mobilization has been decentralized, with young people organizing activities online and by using sms. Protest is difficult to organize and maintain, however. Facing an overwhelming gap between the PCRM and opposition parties' tallies at the polls, lacking clear evidence of widespread falsification and condemnation from international observers, and absent plans to stage long-term protests, the odds are stacked heavily against the opposition.

Post-Election Protest

2009-04-06T19:01:00.005-05:00

Several thousand Moldovans protested the PCRM's victory in yesterday's election, alleging that vote fraud was a major factor in the PCRM's success (the OSCE's preliminary post-election report was generally positive, although some problems were noted). Reports indicate that largely young people were mobilized. Estimates of protest size range from 2,500 to 20,000; photographs certainly suggest that the number of participants exceeds the lowest estimates. More protests are scheduled for Tuesday.

The Results are In

2009-04-06T07:18:00.004-05:00

With just under 2% left to count (98.08% reporting), the Party of Communists (PCRM) has 49.96% of the vote, with the PL (12.78%), PLDM (12.26%), and ALM (9.81%) trailing far behind. With roughly 15% of the vote wasted on parties failing to pass the 6% barrier, the PCRM will secure a majority in parliament. While the exit polls indicated a lower tally for the PCRM, it is likely within the margin of error (which was not reported). Hopefully, the CEC will release data aggregated at a lower level to facilitate more extensive analysis of the results.

[The graphic is posted on the CEC site.]

Preliminary Results in Moldova

2009-04-05T19:08:00.002-05:00

At the time of this post, it is a bit past 3 am in Chisinau, Moldova. The CEC is reporting results with 31.45% of the vote counted, and the Party of Communists leads with 53.87% of the recorded votes. While the CEC has posted information about polling stations, the current reports about voting are aggregated at the national level only. It is difficult to assess how the vote count is likely to evolve without a sense of what precincts have reported. With the previously mentioned BBC report on exit polls as a guide, we should expect the Communist tally to taper off as more results come in.

Turnout in Moldova

2009-04-05T12:47:00.007-05:00

The CEC is reporting regional turnout data (but no precinct-level results seem to be available). As of 6:45 p.m., national turnout was 52.4%, ranging from a high of 73.28% in Basarabeasca to a low of 43.09% in Balti. Lenta.ru notes that the election officially passed the minimum turnout threshold of 50%. The CEC will also post preliminary results, but it is too early for information to be available.

UPDATE (4/5/09, 2:45 pm Central Time (US)): The CEC server seems to be down. A BBC report on exit polls indicates that the Party of Communists should enjoy a substantial win (46%).

UPDATE (4/5/09, 7:00 pm Central Time (US)): The CEC server is up and is reporting some preliminary results as well as updated turnout data.

Under the Radar

2009-04-03T21:05:00.003-05:00

Moldova's parliamentary election is only two days away, but it continues to fly under the radar of Western news organizations (even those covering the post-Soviet region). The CEC has published documents related to the election (pdf in Russian), but its website provides limited information. Moldova Azi reports on CEC preparations and concerns about potential problems on Sunday. The OSCE has posted several preliminary reports. I will post additional information in the coming days, but I am currently attending a conference (limiting my ability to be attentive to the final hours of the campaign).

Presidential Election in Ukraine

2009-04-01T06:53:00.002-05:00

Ukraine's Verkhovna Rada passed a resolution to set the upcoming presidential election for October 25, 2009, three months earlier than previously planned. The president hopes to make constitutional changes before the vote.

Moldova Gears Up

2009-03-25T14:34:00.008-05:00

Moldova's parliamentary election is quickly approaching and a recent opinion poll by the Institute for Public Policy suggests that the Party of Communists should garner around 36% of the vote (see the Moldpres article for some details). Three other parties may pass the 6% threshold: the Liberal Democratic Party, Liberal Party, and Our Moldova Alliance. Our Moldova's polling numbers are the most problematic, with the point estimate below the threshold at 5.4% (the margin of error is 2.8%). An unpublished Imedia report notes that IPP polling has been criticized in the past, in part due to a perception of unreliability. A poll released in the month prior to the 2005 election underestimated the performance of the Bloc of Moldovan Democrats by around 19%, but the predictions for the Party of Communists and Christian Democratic People's Party were close to the final results. You can read more about the election at e-democracy.

[Thanks to Imedia for information on the polling]

Challenging the Political Opposition in Georgia

2009-03-23T09:16:00.005-05:00

In late 2007, President Mikheil Saakashvili was accused of efforts to undermine dissenting voices through aggressive actions toward the media and a crackdown on opposition protesters. Prior to the ill-fated conflict with Russia in August 2008 his erstwhile ally in the Rose Revolution, Nino Burjanadze, surprisingly withdrew from parliamentary elections. Burjanadze has reappeared as a challenger in Georgia's politics, and her partisans now seem to be under additional scrutiny, with a report of ten party members arrested. Burjanadze plans a press conference to address the matter. I will post follow-up information as it appears.

UPDATE (3/23/09, 8:00 p.m.): Additional coverage from Eurasianet, RFE/RL, and lenta.ru.

All Politics is Local

2009-03-22T08:46:00.002-05:00

While national votes receive more public attention, the selection of representatives for local offices often has significant policy repercussions. Not only do local politicians make important decisions (e.g., in some post-Soviet states local officials make land allocation decisions), but local office can provide a staging ground for nationwide campaigns.

Several weeks ago, many Russian regions held local elections, and United Russia performed well in these votes amid allegations of fraud. Some commentaries suggested that the party-of-power's strength might be waning in some areas, however. Yesterday, President Medvedev replaced the governor of Murmansk; although the governor is a member of United Russia, he supported an independent candidate for mayor. In the south, the mayoral election in Sochi has received attention due to the identity of the participants and the importance of the city as host to the upcoming Olympic Games.

In Armenia, defeated presidential candidate (and former president) Levon Ter-Petrossian plans to run for mayor of Yerevan (also see Eurasianet's story). The mayoral post in the capital city is important symbolically and substantively. Because Ter-Petrossian's presidential loss was accompanied by protests and violence, the May 31 showdown is likely to produce high drama.

Early Election in Kyrgyzstan

2009-03-21T15:11:00.006-05:00

According to Eurasianet, the Constitutional Court issued a ruling on March 19 requiring an early presidential election. RFE/RL reports that the election will be held on July 23, 2009.

Consent and Dissent

2009-03-20T07:43:00.011-05:00

UPDATE (3/26/09): While double-checking my referendum data, I discovered that the original data I downloaded was not correctly labeled. Most of the precinct results were shifted over one column, except for the results of Q29 which repeated the results of an earlier question. I am not sure if the error was mine or the CEC's, but I have updated the information I reported earlier.

Azerbaijan's referendum has received praise and criticism, and you may review some of these voices here, here, here, and here. The final turnout was 71.08%, and all 29 questions received at least 87% support nationally according to the CEC.

This post does not review general conclusions about the quality of the voting process, but rather focuses on some of the data coming from Azerbaijan's CEC. The CEC deserves credit for transparency in publishing precinct-level turnout data and results quickly and efficiently. Moreover, just as in the presidential election in October 2008, the CEC installed web cameras in many precincts which allowed anyone to watch the proceedings.[1]

I combined the turnout data with the electronically recorded results protocols for all precincts (as I noted earlier, some precincts report incomplete data). Let's take a deeper look at results for question 21, the question receiving the strongest support according to official results:

101-ci maddənin V hissəsi aşağıdakı redaksiyada verilsin: «V. Müharibə şəraitində hərbi əməliyyatların aparılması Azərbaycan Respublikası Prezidenti seçkilərinin keçirilməsini mümkün etmədikdə Azərbaycan Respublikası Prezidentinin səlahiyyət müddəti hərbi əməliyyatların sonunadək uzadılır. Bu barədə qərar seçkilərin (referendumun) keçirilməsini təmin edən dövlət orqanının müraciətinə əsasən Azərbaycan Respublikasının Konstitusiya Məhkəməsi tərəfindən qəbul edilir.»

In ~~153~~ 247 precincts, the question received unanimous support from voters (accounting for ~~66,039~~ 122,037 votes, or around 2% 4% of all votes cast on this question). Some of these precincts were small, with 27 recording under 100 votes from voters. But several were large; 11 29 included over 1,000 voters. As I noted in a previous post, unanimous results - especially in large precincts - are questionable. Even if there is little dissent on a ballot issue, voters and election officials are not perfect. Voters make mistakes and sometimes render their responses (or entire ballots) invalid. The CEC reports that 3.64% of votes on question 21 were invalid, lower than any other question (question 16 had 4.64% invalid; all other questions were over 5%).

Indeed, many voters cast invalid votes on the question. Invalid votes could reflect mistakes, or intentional efforts to show dissent without recording a no vote. In ~~4,521~~ 4,297 precincts (out of 5,367 precincts), at least one ballot was invalid ("etibarsız") on question 21. In ~~1,052~~ 418 precincts, 10% or more were recorded as invalid, accounting for ~~124,796~~ 50,176 votes (or a bit more than ~~3.5%~~ 1% of the vote based on precinct returns). No precincts recorded a majority of "no" votes on question 21. ~~In only one precinct did the sum of "no" and invalid votes exceed 50%.~~

[1] While Internet video monitoring increases openness, it also could influence less sophisticated or older voters who may believe that their presence at the polls will be recorded (inducing them to turn out and vote). But, this is a subject for another post.

Some Thoughts on Turnout in Azerbaijan

2009-03-18T16:05:00.011-05:00

The CEC's preliminary results show overwhelming support for all of the questions in the referendum. In October's presidential election, the main question did not surround the outcome, however, but rather turnout. While no minimum threshold threatened the outcome, observers thought that President Aliyev's partisans would ensure a strong turnout to show support. Turnout measures mobilization and is the primary issue for the referendum as well.

The graphic to the left shows a simple box plot of the precinct-level turnout data published by the CEC. The CEC posted turnout data from 5,367 precincts, although some precinct-level data are incomplete (e.g., TEC 29 has three precincts with no results reported). As a visual representation of simple descriptive statistics, the box plot does not provide rigorous analysis. However, it shows some interesting results and suggests that some cases might be outliers. The 50th percentile is represented by the line in the rectangle; the 25 and 75th percentiles by the upper and lower bounds of the box. Observations outside the "whiskers" are outlying cases worthy of further investigation.

At 10 a.m., two precincts reported over 75% turnout (TEC 96, PEC 45 and TEC 98 PEC 27). These precincts are small, and could be located in special precincts where turnout can be managed. Turnout management could be benign (i.e., hospital patients may be transported to the precinct and may vote early) or questionable. At the closing of the polls, 60 precincts reported 100% turnout. These precincts also report questionable results. In TEC 41, PECs 37 and 38 both had 1,500 registered voters and all registered voters reportedly cast ballots. According to the published protocols, all of the voters in both precincts cast affirmative ballots for each of the 29 questions on the ballot. While not impossible, these results are highly improbable. Indeed, one would expect that among 3,000 voters, at least one voter might have made an error on a ballot with 29 questions, invalidating it.

This commentary begs the question: what is the normal pace of turnout? In my earlier post, I suggested that 30% could be a "reasonable" upper bound for turnout figures at 10 a.m. The figure of 30% was purely hypothetical; my main point was that a reasonable upper bound at 10 a.m. is lower than a reasonable upper bound at 5 p.m. (while the lower bound could always, in principle, be zero). As the day progresses, increasing variance in turnout reports is not necessarily surprising. No research, to my knowledge, has identified a pace of turnout that conforms with free and fair practices. Indeed, the pace of turnout is likely to be affected by many factors: the perceived closeness of the race, the level of citizen interest, and if election day is on a work day or holiday, among other factors. A forthcoming article by Pacek, Pop-Eleches, and Tucker in the Journal of Politics shows that the perceived importance of an election can strongly affect turnout in post-communist societies (my own research concurs with their finding). The referendum was portrayed as important enough for citizens to be motivated to show regime support. Yet, the preliminary data also raise some red flags about manipulation. I will post additional analysis as I look more deeply at the data.

Voting Underway in Azerbaijan

2009-03-18T08:25:00.006-05:00

Azerbaijan's CEC has reported 64.12% turnout at 5 p.m. The figures throughout the day show increasing variance in turnout levels at the territorial constituency level. This is not surprising as the upper bound for turnout increases as the day progresses (that is, a reasonable range for turnout at 10 a.m. might peak at 30%, but by mid-day the upper bound is higher.). The figure on the left shows turnout figures reported at each official time period and a regression line. The regression line puts final turnout around 85%, but the fit of a linear regression may not best represent the distribution. Turnout seems to be tapering off and may end up closer to 75%. The final turnout data should be reported at 7p.m. Azerbaijan time.

The CEC is also reporting precinct level data. In the district with the highest turnout at 10 a.m. (TEC 118), some precincts are reporting around 80% turnout at 5:00 p.m. I will look at the turnout data in more detail as the final results come in.

Election Eve

2009-03-17T00:01:00.002-05:00

As the March 18 constitutional referendum quietly approaches, official bodies and news sites are covering the vote:

The Central Electoral Commission has made available voting lists and other administrative information. AzerTAg, the state information agency, notes that President Aliyev met with the "Ad Hoc Committee" that will observe the referendum and that the CEC Director met with the CIS observation mission. In total, around 170 international observers and 47,000 domestic observers are expected to participate.
Day.az has an interview with a presidential advisor who promises that the referendum will meet international standards.
Trend News has several articles about the referendum, including stories about the New Azerbaijan Party's confidence in high turnout and high levels of support and opposition plans to observe the voting process.
The BBC has a video covering the basics of Azerbaijan's politics.

Democratic Constitutional Change?

2009-03-08T13:53:00.015-05:00

Azerbaijan's Trend News reported that Michael Hancock, a British MP from the Liberal Democratic Party and a representative to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, supported the democratic credentials of the upcoming constitutional referendum, stating:

"If the nation wants to scrap limits on presidential terms, then this is democratic... I monitored the elections in Azerbaijan and they took place very normally... I do not blame the government, but rather the opposition in this case because they are not playing an active role in the elections. There were some problems during the elections in my country, as well." (Quotes from the March 6, 2009 Trend News article.)

The newly re-opened Day.az (for different treatments of the closure of Day.az see APA and Eurasianet) presented the comments in a slightly different manner, noting that Hancock called constitutional changes "normal and logical." Specifically, Hancock is quoted as stating:

«После распада Советского Союза в бывших союзных республиках были приняты новые Конституции, которые, несомненно, носили временный характер. Поэтому внесение изменений в эти законодательные акты нормально и логично» ["After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, new constitutions were ratified in the former Soviet republics that, undoubtedly, were temporary. Therefore, carrying out changes in these legislative acts is normal and logical."]

Azadliq has raised questions about the Western voices supporting the referendum. Without parsing every word that Hancock reportedly said, or possible reasons for his comments, it is worth assessing the issue of "democratic" constitutional change through referendums.

The requirements for changing constitutions vary cross-nationally; holding a national referendum is not unreasonable. In Hancock's own country, changes to the basic laws (the UK has no formal constitution) are within the purview of parliament. In other countries, constitutional changes must obtain legislative approval and pass another barrier (e.g., in the United States, barring a constitutional convention, national legislative approval (2/3 votes in both houses) is accompanied by approval in state legislatures (in 3/4 of states)). Azerbaijan's parliament approved the referendum, and it is scheduled to take place in ten days. In terms of formal institutional procedures, the process falls within democratic norms.

Hancock's comments about the opposition's failure to engage ignores important contextual issues. While Azerbaijan's opposition is fragmented and was disengaged from the last presidential election in October, past repression of protests undermines mobilization efforts (see the BBC documentary: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5). Opposition groups have challenged the referendum, but most referendums in the post-Soviet region (including those in Azerbaijan) tend to favor the sitting regime and tend to succeed.

Election day procedures in Azerbaijan may also appear to be normal. On election day in October, I observed a dozen polling sites in Baku and in most cases, the procedure was straightforward and orderly. However, government influence over the media, the dominant position of pro-government forces in electoral commissions and other critical choke points, and the lack of political diversity in formal political institutions renders the process suspect. Most of the problems with elections are not manifested on election day, but rather in the process that undermines competition long before ballots are cast.

The general principle of a legislature initiating a nationwide referendum for constitutional change falls within democratic norms. Codifying constitutions during the transition may confer a temporary character on them; it is not unreasonable to modify basic laws. But, for the constitutional change to be democratic, the institutions initiating change should be selected via free and fair processes, procedures should be open and transparent, and citizens (and political actors) should have access to alternate sources of information.

UPDATE (3/09/09): I neglected to note in yesterday's post that the Council of Europe has recommended a delay to the referendum. The CoE indicated that an upcoming Venice Commission report (due on March 13) will address questions about changes to local government authority. Some elements of the constitutional reform may contradict the European Charter for Local Self-Government.

Latvia's Government Falls

2009-02-21T08:05:00.009-06:00

The worldwide financial crisis has claimed Latvia's government. As I discussed in an earlier post, economic challenges could change the election calendar in some post-Soviet states. Latvia's prime minister resigned on Friday, triggering speculation about the possibility of an early election. A new coalition agreement is possible, with several willing partners discussing alternatives. The likelihood of early elections seems low at the moment, but events in Riga over the next couple of weeks will determine if a new agreement is possible.

Another Early Election in Kyrgyzstan?

2009-02-18T13:13:00.009-06:00

Reports suggest that President Kurmanbek Bakiyev will engineer an early presidential election. Bakiyev has already announced his intention to run for office, and the Constitutional Court may move up the planned election date from 2010 to late 2009. Bakiyev used a constitutional referendum and early elections in 2007 to consolidate his support, but (divided) opposition to his rule seems to be increasing. An analysis by Erica Marat in the February 18 edition of the Jamestown Foundation's Eurasia Daily Monitor makes several interesting points:

The election timetable may be accelerated due to current relations with Russia. The recent decision to accept aid from Russia and end US access to a key airbase near Bishkek could help secure fickle Kremlin support. Moreover, Bakiyev could benefit from the Russian-backed construction of a hydroelectric power station that was a part of the aid package and is scheduled to move forward after 2009.
Bakiyev's strategies are similar to those of the ousted Askar Akayev who also used manipulated referendums and elections to his advantage. Unlike Akayev, Bakiyev may have stronger control over security forces, but also faces more challenging economic conditions.

Another Upcoming Election

2009-02-17T13:38:00.003-06:00

In addition to Azerbaijan's referendum and Moldova's parliamentary election, noted in yesterday's post, Lithuania will be holding a presidential election on May 17, 2009. Until this election campaign heats up, I am posting a (somewhat dated) Lithuanian plan to introduce Internet voting that is worth a glance.

Election Season Underway

2009-02-16T12:25:00.004-06:00

The preparations for Azerbaijan's upcoming referendum have been relatively uneventful (the only exception is a prominent assassination that is unconnected to the upcoming vote). Azerbaijan's Central Electoral Commission has posted a useful summary of proposed changes to the constitution, including the most notable one: eliminating presidential term limits. The opposition plans to observe the proceedings and may organize protests.

The active campaign period has begun in Moldova, with the CEC beginning party registration. Unlike the CEC in Azerbaijan, Moldova's CEC has not updated its page with information about the 2009 contest. More than two dozen parties are registered with the Ministry of Justice, but it is unlikely that all of these groups will contest seats independently. RFE/RL has posted a brief summary of the issues facing Moldova's voters.

I will follow both votes and post regular updates.

More Protests

2009-01-31T18:49:00.008-06:00

Citizens in Georgia and Russia have recently taken to the streets to challenge sitting governments. In Georgia, the opposition to President Mikheil Saakashvili has renewed its efforts to oust him from the presidency and hold new elections for the executive and legislative branches. The participation of Nino Burjanadze, a respected politician and erstwhile ally of Saakashvili during the Rose Revolution, increases the clout of anti-government actors. Strong opposition leadership, along with the repercussions of the financial crisis and the brief war with Russia in August 2008, could facilitate mobilization efforts. If critical government institutions, such as the security services, are reticent to support Saakashvili, the opposition could make progress on its demands. However, people are notoriously difficult to mobilize.

In Russia, demonstrations and counter-demonstrations about the government's response to the economic crisis were held on Saturday in several cities. Anti-government protesters called for the ouster of Prime Minister Putin; pro-government protesters expressed support for the government's efforts to combat the economic crisis. Unlike the opposition in Georgia, Russia's opposition does not appear to have a unified, charismatic leadership. Moreover, the main government institutions and media continue to support the president and prime minister. Mobilization is undermined by government repression and limited access to the national media. However, economic crisis could be used as a pretense to hold early elections, providing an opportunity for the prime minister to return to the presidency (with extended term limits). For various interpretations of the events in Russia, see: BBC, Lenta.ru, RIA Novosti, RFE/RL, and the New York Times.

Other Elections in Russia

2009-01-29T12:47:00.007-06:00

After holding national-level elections for parliament in late 2007 and president in early 2008, no major contests are officially on the horizon in Russia. Nevertheless, 2009 has already featured interesting voting opportunities.

The death of the Russian Orthodox Church's Patriarch, Alexey II, prompted an election of his successor. Similar to the election of the Roman Catholic Pope, the voting procedure involves a limited selectorate primarily consisting of high-ranking Church officials (in this case, the 702-member Local Council that includes "bishops, priests, monks, and laymen"). In contrast to papal elections, the election featured a campaign that turned negative. In addition, the Local Council cast secret ballots with journalists present (only the deliberations were closed). Three candidates contested the position (although one withdrew before the final vote), and Metropolitan Kirill won 508 votes (72%). While elections of religious figures provide limited opportunities for analysis, especially because most of the data are not publicly available, some interesting work has been done (e.g., Colomer and McLean (1998), an article that applies social choice theory to early papal elections).

Some of Russia's regions are also holding local elections, including Kostroma and Bryansk. Svobodanews.ru has posted interesting commentary.

Sources for the Patriarch elections:
Moscow Times
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty
Reuters
RIA Novosti

Photo courtesy of Reuters, Alexander Natruskin, January 25, 2009.

Potential Election Law Reforms in Russia

2009-01-28T11:19:00.005-06:00

Vladislav Surkov, the first deputy chief of the presidential administration, announced yesterday that proposals to modify party registration and parliamentary election rules will be forwarded to the Duma. If the reforms move forward as outlined, signature requirements for party registration will be lowered roughly in half (to 100,000-120,000) with a final target of 30,000-35,000 (no timetable was set for the final reduction). In addition, the electoral threshold will be modified. While the 7% threshold will remain, parties receiving over 5% of the vote will receive token representation in parliament.

These potential reforms are similar to recent changes proposed in Kazakhstan; minor tinkering that may expand competition, but only on the margins.

Thanks to Johnson's Russia List for the story.

Opening Salvos

2009-01-27T19:51:00.009-06:00

The major players in Kyiv are officially setting their sights on the upcoming presidential election. President Yushchenko has proposed a January 17, 2010 election date, a position supported by Parliamentary Speaker Volodymyr Lytvyn . Yuliya Tymoshenko's parliamentary party has proposed an earlier election date, December 27, 2009. President Yushchenko is looking for the next plenary session scheduled for next week to resolve the timing of the presidential election; Tymoshenko's party plans to propose changes to the legislation on presidential elections.

These exchanges are the opening salvos in the presidential race. The timing could affect turnout, with BYuT's proposed date falling before the major winter holidays and the president's proposed date falling just after them (Старый Новый год will be on January 13, 2010). But, this debate is minor compared to the battles yet to come.

Two Updates

2009-01-19T10:52:00.004-06:00

Several news sources are reporting that the People's Party, the main party in Latvia's coalition government, supports the idea of early elections (see, for example, the CBS News adaptation of the AP wire story, and the Baltic Times). A new election date has not yet been set, however.

Whereas the timing and outcome of Latvia's (potential) early election are unknown, Azerbaijan's referendum increasingly looks like a foregone conclusion. Azerireport cites an interview in Bizim Yol in which a Ministry of Education official reportedly notes that a new textbook on the constitution includes changes that have not yet been approved by the March 2009 referendum. If confirmed, this report suggests that Azerbaijan's government is dispensing with the pretense of a competitive vote this spring.

Kazakhstan's Election Law Change

2009-01-15T07:23:00.003-06:00

Kazakhstan's upper house (Senate) approved changes to the Law on Elections in the Republic of Kazakhstan and Law on Political Parties (discussed in a previous post. Also see today's press releases by the Khabar News Agency and Associated Press). The main modifications include a provision to allocate seats to at least two political parties, even if only one passes the 7% threshold, and a reduction in the total number of signatures required for party registration to 40,000 (from 50,000) and a minimum of 600 in each region. Opposition politicians have advocated for a lower threshold (3%) and better representation on electoral commissions.

The primary audience for these reforms is external. By making changes that President Nazarbayev promised in the summer, Kazakhstan demonstrates that it is eager to claim the chairmanship of the OSCE and is willing to make modest institutional changes to mollify critics. Once signed by President Nazarbayev, these changes will have a limited effect on politics in Kazakhstan. The most likely outcome is for a second pro-government party to gain a modest number of seats in the next parliamentary election.

Financial Crisis and Elections?

2009-01-13T19:43:00.006-06:00

A potential consequence of the worldwide financial crisis is early elections, as economic pressure undermines public confidence in sitting governments. In the post-Soviet region, several governments have been hit hard, but it is in Latvia where pressure for early elections has increased. Earlier today, a protest calling for new elections turned violent in Riga. The BBC reported that 10,000 people participated in the initial, peaceful protest, the largest political demonstration since Latvia regained independence. Also see the Baltic Times and Chas (in Russian) for coverage. Photo: Reuters/Ints Kalnins (Latvia)

UPDATE (1/14/09): The New York Times reports that President Valdis Zatlers may call a referendum on dissolving parliament and holding early elections.

New Year's Resolutions

2009-01-01T08:28:00.007-06:00

While last year's trends in the post-Soviet region were not solely negative, the year featured few bright spots for proponents of free and fair elections as the primary path to policy-making power. The use of electoral mechanisms to institutionalize authoritarian rule advanced in several post-Soviet states in 2008, and is likely to continue in 2009.

All three states in the South Caucasus held elections of dubious quality (Presidential elections took place in Georgia (January 2008), Armenia (February 2008), and Azerbaijan (October 2008). Georgia held a parliamentary election in May 2008 and a placed two referendum questions on the ballot during the January presidential election). In Azerbaijan, major opposition parties boycotted the presidential election and did not stage post-election protests. Next year's referendum to eliminate term limits will create conditions for a "hereditary dictatorship" (as a commenter on a previous post designated it).
Central Asia's electoral calendar was relatively quiet in 2008, save for the one-party "contest" in Turkmenistan (December 2008). Proposals for election rule tinkering in Kazakhstan and Tajikistan will not fundamentally alter the environment for political competition if/when they are enacted in 2009.
Three European post-Soviet states held elections in 2008. Russia's March presidential election and Belarus' September parliamentary election provided little drama. Next door, Lithuania's October parliamentary election and referendum were hotly contested. Several political maneuvers set the stage for decreased competition in the region. Last week, the proposal to extend presidential term limits in Russia moved forward as the Federation Council approved the bill following its endorsement by regional legislatures. On December 30, 2008, President Medvedev signed the bill which also extended the term of parliamentary deputies from four to five years. The regime's success in co-opting Nikita Belykh, the former leader of the defunct Union of Right Forces and (former) regime critic, underscores the lack of political space for the opposition in contemporary Russia. Moldova's rejection of a reduction in the electoral threshold, and addition of a vetting requirement for candidates via security services, undermines open contestation. While Ukraine has not yet moved away from competitive electoral politics, chaotic political machinations in the capital city, including the threat of an early parliamentary election and inability of the government to respond to financial, energy, and infrastructure crises, test the limits of the public's patience for democratic politics.

The Coming Monarchy?

2008-12-27T21:47:00.006-06:00

Azerbaijan's Milli Mejlis approved the proposed referendum to remove presidential term limits. The vote was 100 in favor, 7 opposed, 1 abstention, and 2 absences. The public vote is tentatively scheduled for March 18, 2009. Opponents of Ilham Aliyev have characterized this maneuver as an attempt to institutionalize the Aliyev family's brand of dynastic succession and scuttle any possibility of democratization. This decision, coupled with the threat of increased restrictions on foreign media broadcasts, and lack of a cohesive opposition with charismatic leadership, does not bode well for the future of competitive politics in Azerbaijan.

UPDATE (December 31, 2008): The National Television and Radio Council announced that it will bar foreign broadcasts on Azerbaijan's airwaves as of January 1, 2009. You may read reports and reactions from the BBC, RFE/RL, Voice of America, and the US State Department through the links. Russia's entertainment-oriented Europa Plus radio station also faces the ban, but makes no obvious mention of it on the website. The inclusion of Europa Plus shows the "multi vector" foreign policy approach at work; American, British, and Russian concerns are to be taken off the air. These broadcasts are not equivalent in content, however.

Election Rule Tinkering in Tajikistan?

2008-12-22T09:35:00.007-06:00

IFES reports that a modest proposal for election reform has been prepared for consideration by the Majlisi Oli. The recommended rule changes address party representation on electoral commissions and election observation. Governing parties in many post-Soviet states have effectively managed the balloting process in their favor by controlling the institutions that administer elections and adjudicate disputes.

Unfortunately, guaranteeing wider representation on election commissions does not prevent fraud. For example, as an observer in Ukraine's 2004 presidential election, I witnessed an unbalanced electoral commission admit questionable ballots favoring Viktor Yanukovych while denying analogous ballots favoring Viktor Yushchenko. The commission included members representing minor candidates from the first round of balloting who were "covert" supporters of Yanukovych. Membership rules allowed politicians to load commissions in their favor by sponsoring or co-opting minor candidates. Expanding committee membership can facilitate other forms of manipulation and fraud as political actors adapt to the rules and their incentives. However, improving representation on electoral commissions is an important step forward.

Election Rules vs. Parliamentary Regulations

2008-12-22T06:32:00.006-06:00

Ukraine's politicians have regularly explored election rule reform to enhance their outcomes at the polls and increase their policy-making authority. The first post-Soviet election featured 450 constituencies, with winners selected via a modified majority runoff system and negative ballots. Voters would cross out the names of candidates that they opposed; candidates could only win a seat with a majority of positive votes. Because many districts did not produce clear winners, multiple by-elections were held and many constituencies went unrepresented. Election rule reform prior to the 1998 parliamentary election instituted a mixed electoral system, with 225 seats filled in constituencies using a plurality rule, and 225 seats filled through a national-level party list with a 4% threshold.

While conducting research in Kyiv in 1999, I spoke with one of the authors of the law instituting mixed election rules. He believed that the rules were more democratic, functioned better than the previous system, and would provide benefits to his political party (Rukh). This combination of normative and strategic motivations has influenced other reform efforts.

Prior to the 2002 elections, opposition politicians attempted to institute a fully proportional system in place of the mixed electoral system (as well as attempting to modify the mixed system). Although bills passed through the Verkhovna Rada, President Leonid Kuchma vetoed them. President Kuchma's position on PR changed after the 2002 election, and he packaged election rule change with a constitutional reform bill to co-opt legislators from the Communist Party and Socialist Party. Closed-list PR with a 3% threshold has been used in the last two parliamentary elections, held in 2006 and 2007.

With recent talk of another pre-term election, several election rule reform proposals have been floating around Kyiv. One proposal would have the party gaining the plurality in the PR vote earn minimally 226 seats (to guarantee a majority). A variant on this proposal would feature two rounds of competition (with the top two parties competing for a majority in a second round).

Since election rules have not produced a clear and stable majority, politicians have turned to other devices. Unlike other reform efforts that featured at least a normative veneer, the most recent proposal is designed solely for short-term strategic gains. Nazar Boyko reports in Obkom that politicians from the Bloc of Yuliya Tymoshenko have targeted parliamentary regulations as mechanism to gain advantages.

Boyko notes: "В зарегистрированном проекте постановления Андрей Портнов, не мудрствуя лукаво, предлагает упразднить норму регламента, которая предполагает необходимость личных подписей народных депутатов при создании коалиции. Бютовец считает, что уже самих списков членов депутатских фракций, которые формируют коалицию, будет вполне достаточно. ...Также Андрей Портнов не прочь пересмотреть порядок приостановления деятельности коалиции. Сейчас существование коалиции прекращается в случае, если происходит уменьшение численного состава коалиции к количеству народных депутатов, меньшему, чем определено Конституцией Украины. Портнов решил перекроить на свой лад: деятельность коалиции прекращается в случае выхода из состава коалиции депутатской фракции, вследствие чего количество депутатов в депутатских фракциях, сформировавших коалицию, стало меньшим, чем определено Конституцией."

The recent coalition breakdown was due, in part, to the narrow majority of seats claimed by its two participants (Bloc of Yuliya Tymoshenko and Our Ukraine-People's Self Defense) and the weakness of Ukrainian parties. Because parties have few tools to ensure deputy loyalty, deputies can defect from the leadership's preferences with limited consequences. The proposed change to parliamentary regulations would allow a coalition to form without obtaining the signatures of all members. Rather, the coalition would require that at the time of its formation, the participating factions have at least 226 members. Under this rule, a coalition could break down, but formally continue to exist with a small minority of deputies supporting it.

This proposal, like many other efforts at institutional reform in Ukraine, focuses on the short-term goals of its sponsors. While this proposal would strengthen the current coalition's position, it could generate a crisis of legitimacy if the coalition loses support among deputies. Moreover, this institutional reform sets an uncomfortable precedent by formalizing a "majority" coalition but precluding standard mechanisms to remove under-performing governments. Expect to see more proposals like this one down the line.

Reform in Kazakhstan?

2008-12-19T13:30:00.006-06:00

Several post-Soviet countries have recently adopted proportional representation (PR) electoral systems for their national legislatures. While PR is traditionally associated with multiparty politics, results in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Russia have produced one-party dominant parliaments. In addition to national closed-list PR, all three countries feature high thresholds, registration challenges for opposition parties, and unbalanced media coverage favoring dominant politicians and their allied parties.

Kazakhstan's last election results were the most egregiously one-sided: only Nur-Otan gained seats in parliament. These results created a problem of perception, as Kazakhstan aspired to have a term chairing the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) at the time of the election. Despite concerns about its democratic credentials, Kazakhstan was granted the position in 2010. However, the OSCE expected Kazakhstan's government to make institutional reforms. Eurasianet reports that several election rule changes are being discussed, including a modified threshold (retaining 7%, but admitting a second party if only one wins), and lowering the signature requirement for parties (currently, Kazakhstan has the most restrictive registration rules in the region, requiring 50,000 signatures for parties - roughly 1 out of every 306 Kazakh citizens).

The Eurasianet article notes that the proposed changes have been criticized by major opposition parties. Indeed, the proposed changes are minor, and would likely produce ersatz pluralism. Previous elections have generated multiparty parliaments, but parliamentary support of the president has not been in question since 1995.

Observing the Observers

2008-12-18T07:10:00.004-06:00

Governments in many post-Soviet states have accused international election observation missions of unfair practices, double-standards, and excessively negative reports. By contrast, participants in some missions have argued that international and domestic pressure sometimes leads to improperly flattering assessments.

Monday's New York Times profiled problems with election observation in post-Soviet states. The most pointed criticism was directed at missions dispatched by the Commonwealth of Independent States. While CIS standards seem to be low to non-existent (CIS observers do not seem to have witnessed an election that, from their perspective, fails to meet international standards), all organizations could improve the quality of election observation missions.

As Thomas Carothers and others noted in the Journal of Democracy over a decade ago, many international observation teams are inadequately trained, lack relevant language skills, and focus too much attention on election day activities. The need to quickly issue reports the day after balloting precludes careful analysis of the data collected in the field. On a related note, the organizations conducting missions do not seem to make the raw data and observer commentaries collected in polling sites publicly available, undermining transparency and confidence in the summary reports. All observer organizations, not only the CIS, could benefit from improvements in their methods of observing elections.

Looking Forward to 2009

2008-12-17T14:00:00.001-06:00

Several post-Soviet states should hold elections in 2009.

Moldova is due for parliamentary elections in the spring, and politicians are already preparing for balloting. President Vladimir Voronin recently rejected an EU recommendation to lower the relatively high 6% electoral threshold. This barrier has enhanced the proportion of wasted votes (23.5% in 1998, 17.8% in 2001, and 14.7% in 2005) and has prevented some parties with reasonable levels of electoral support from gaining seats (e.g., Democratic Party of Moldova in 2001). The threshold has also enhanced disproportionality in seat allocation, benefiting the Party of Communists which took 55% of the seats with 46% of the vote in 2005. While rejecting efforts to lower the threshold, Voronin's Party of Communists has proposed a law requiring candidates to be vetted by security services prior to gaining ballot access. This effort, coupled with the possible closure of an independent TV station, does not augur well for improvements in the quality of elections.

On the heels of its parliamentary election and referendum on the Ignalina power plant in 2008, Lithuania should hold a presidential contest in late spring 2009. While some sources characterized the parliamentary election as having an anti-EU flavor, this interpretation was challenged by a Lithuanian blogger and political observer. The referendum on extending the life of the Ignalina plant implied that Lithuanians might challenge EU rulings, but it failed. The election produced a highly fragmented parliament (with the effective number of electoral parties index at nearly 9). Homeland Union was the "winner," but it garnered only 45 seats, or 26% of the Seimas. The coalition government, confirmed on December 9, 2008, leans center-right and includes: Homeland Union (PM, plus finance, foreign affairs, economy, social security/labor, agriculture, and defense portfolios), Liberal Movement (Justice, Transport and Communications, Education and Science), Liberal Center Party (Health and Interior), and National Resurrection Party (Environment and Culture). With the previous presidential election in 2004 following the impeachment of President Rolandas Paksas, the upcoming election should be highly contested.

The biggest question mark on the 2009 election calendar is Ukraine. After President Viktor Yushchenko issued a decree to dissolve parliament and hold early elections in December 2008, a new coalition seems to have taken hold. While an agreement among the Bloc of Yuliya Tymoshenko, Our Ukraine-People's Self-Defense, and the Bloc of Volodymyr Lytvyn was signed on December 16, the power struggle is far from over. President Yushchenko is exploring the expulsion of deputies from his party who supported the coalition. An early parliamentary election is not out of the question. The presidential election, due five years after the remarkable 2004 election, may take place in late 2009 or early 2010.